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Abs t ract
Thi s paper selecti vel y review s the l i t erature on behavi oural fi nance,  focusi ng on t he aggregat e  ma r ket  
i mp l i cati ons  of  t he  behavi oural  bi ases t hat   t hi s l i t erature has  i dent i f i ed.  A dvocat es of  behavi oural  econom i cs 
and  f i nance  argue  t hat   econom i c agents behave  i n  a wa y   wh i ch depart s signi f i cantl y  and  system ati call y  f r om  
t he  axiom s  of  expected ut i l i t y  t heory.   The  paper  surveys  t he  ma i n  “anom ali es” i dent i f i ed by  t hi s l i t erature i n 
t he l i ght  of thei r  possibl e imp l i cati ons on aggregate m arket  behavi our.  In part i cular,  the anom al i es are 
categori sed i nt o ( i )   t hose deri ved f r om  cogni t i ve l i mi t ati ons ( bounded r ati onal i t y),   ( i i )   t hose det ermi ned by 
t he  i nt erf erence of  agents’  em oti onal   state,  ( i i i )   t hose  det ermi ned  by  choi ce bracketi ng,   and  ( i v)  t hose  wh i ch 
suggest  that  a pre-det ermi ned set  of preferences does not  exist alt oget her.  Mo r eover,  prospect  theory i s 
surveyed i n part i cular det ail ,  as it  has becom e a seri ous chall enger to expect ed uti l i t y i n econom i cs and 
f i nance due t o t he em pi r i cal support ,  it s m athem at i cal tr actabil i t y and i t s being consi stent wi t h rati onal  
expectati ons.   Fi nal l y,   t he  paper  claims   t hat   wh i l e convi nci ng  evidence  against   ma r ket   r at i onal i t y  i n  t he  beat -
t he-ma r ket   sense i s yet   t o  be  provi ded,   m any  i ndi cati ons  are now   avail able t hat   f i nanci al  ma r ket s ma y   i ndeed 
be  “ir r ati onal ” i n  ot her  r easonabl e and  r elevant  m eanings.
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A  drunk  wa l ki ng  t hrough  a f i eld  can create a r andom   wa l k,   despi t e 
t he fact that  no one w oul d call  hi s choi ce of di r ecti on rati onal .  
( Thal er,   1999b,   p.   14)
Behavi oural  f i nance [ …]   i n essence simp l y r ecogni ses t hat   hum an
bei ngs,  indi vi dual l y and col l ecti vel y,  behave as hum ans (havi ng 
psychol ogi cal qual i t i es) and not  as gas m olecules (havi ng onl y 
m ass and  vel oci t y).
( Fr ankfurt er  and  M cG oun,   1999,   p.   170)
The appropri ateness of pri ces [due t o m arket  eff i ciency] prot ects
sm all ,  possibl y nonrati onal  invest ors w hose stock purchases m ay 
be gui ded by ast r ol ogy,  a w ort hl ess techni cal system , or me r e 
wh i m.
( Zeckhauser,   Pat el  and  H endri cks,  1991,   p.   7)
1.   I nt r oduct i on
Behavi oural  econom i cs and f i nance i s one of  t he mo s t   dynam i c  and prom i sing f i elds of  econom i c r esearch 
and i t s scope and si ze, as m easured by t he num ber of cont r i but i ons i n recent years, is progressing at  a 
stunni ng pace.  Ther e i s an i ncreasingl y l ong l i st  of  phenom ena wh i ch,  wh i l e cannot   be expl ained wi t h t he 
standard t ool s and approaches of ma i nst r eam  econom i cs, have found a sat i sfactory expl anati on i n
behavi oural  econom i cs and  f i nance  ( see,  f or  i nst ance,  t he  papers coll ected i n  K ahnem an  and  Tver sky,   2000).  
N onet hel ess, that  the behavi oural me t hodol ogy w i l l  com e t o dom i nat e econom i c research and com pletely 
suppl ant  t he  ma i nst r eam  approach based  on  expected ut i l i t y  ma x i mi sati on  and r ati onal i t y  i s f ar  f r om   bei ng  a 
f oregone concl usi on,   and opposi t e vi ew s have been expressed i n t hi s r espect  ( i n t he behavi oural  cam p,  see
Thal er,   2000,   and  Col i sk,  1996;   on  t he  ma i nst r eam  side,   see f or  exam ple Fam a,   1998,   and Rubi nst ein,   2000).  
Ag a i nst  thi s background,  thi s paper wi l l  selecti vel y t ouch upon recent cont r i but i ons i n t he behavi oural 
f i nance l i t erature.  The  obj ecti ve of  t hi s review  i s t o provi de a ( t entati ve)  answ er  t o t he f ol l ow i ng t wo   key 
quest i ons:
-W h a t  are the m ost  im port ant and system ati c (i . e.,  predictable) behavi oural bi ases w hich characteri se 
econom i c agents t hat   we   know   of?
-A r e t hey r elevant  t o understand aggregat e  ma r ket   behavi our,   nam el y do t hey aff ect  pri ces set  i n l arge,  
com peti t i ve  ma r ket s?
I t   has  t o  be  em phasi sed t hat   t hi s r eview  has  no  pretence t o  be  exhaust i ve,   as t he  behavi oural  f i nance  l i t erature 
i s simp l y  t oo  l arge  and  com plex t o  be  s u mma r i sed i n  any  r easonable num ber  of  pages.   Thus,   t he  r eview  wi l l  
be  selecti ve.   Mo r eover,   wh i l e t hi s r eview  does  not   aim  t o  be  alwa y s   necessari l y  ori gi nal   i n  i t s i nt erpretati ons 
com pared wi t h  existi ng  r eview s ( f or  i nst ance,  Ra bi n,   1998,   Shi l l er,   1998,   Shl eif er,   2000,   t he  i nt r oduct i on i n 
K ahnem an  and  Tver sky,   2000,   Thal er,   2000,   and  Da n i el  et  al,   2002,   t o  nam e  j ust   a f ew ),   i t   wi l l   depart   f r om  
existi ng ma t eri al  i n aspects of  i nt erpretati on and assessm ent,   as we l l   as i n categori sing t he f i ndi ngs of  t he 
l i t erature.  I n  short ,   t hi s paper  cont ains  a review   but   also a personal   view  on  t he  behavi oural  f i nance  l i t erature 
and on t he relevance of it s fi ndi ngs t o understand m arket  behavi our.  Mo r eover,  thi s review  w il l  be m ore 3
f ocused t han existi ng ones ( wi t h t he possibl e excepti on of  Da n i el  et   al,   2002)  on t he system ati c aggregat e
ma r ket   i mp l i cati ons  of  agents’  behavi oural  bi ases.  Fi nal l y,   t hi s r eview  i s ma r kedl y  non-t echni cal  i f   com pared 
wi t h t he exi sti ng ones,  ma k i ng i t  hopeful l y easier to di gest  for a reader not  fam il i ar wi t h t hi s str and of 
l i t erature.
I n  a nut shell ,   behavi oural  f i nance  r ejects a vi sion  of  econom i c agents’  behavi our  based  on  t he  ma x i mi sati on 
of we l l - defi ned preferences using subj ecti ve probabi l i t i es and based on t he Savage axi om s,  such as
t r ansit i vi t y and m onot oni cit y.  At  t he root  of thi s rejecti on i s the overwh e l mi ng evi dence avail able that  
agents,  bot h  i n  cont r ol l ed experi me n t s and i n  r eal  l i f e sit uat i ons,   behave  i n  a wa y   so as t o  vi ol ate t he  axiom s 
of  expected ut i l i t y ( St arme r ,   2000).   I t   shoul d be em phasi sed at  f i r st  t hat   t he f ocus of  behavi oural  f i nance i s 
on a  posi t i ve descri pt i on of hum an behavi our especiall y under r i sk and uncert aint y,  r ather t han on a
norm at i ve analysi s of  behavi our  wh i ch i s mo r e t ypi cal  of  t he  ma i nst r eam  approach based  on  expected ut i l i t y 
ma x i mi sati on.  I ndeed,  t he norma t i ve opt i ma l i t y of  expected ut i l i t y ma x i mi sati on i s seldom  chall enged i n t he 
behavi oural  f i nance l i t erature;  i t   i s conceded t hat   an agent  w ho i s wi l l i ng and able t o ma x i mi se hi s l i f eti me  
expected ut i l i t y wi l l   end up bei ng bet t er  off   on average t han hi s peers w ho f ol l ow  alt ernat i ve,   mo r e naï ve 
decision  m odel s ( R ead,  Loew enstein  and  Ra bi n,   1999).
On e  o f  the key obj ecti ves of behavi oural fi nance i s to understand t he system ati c m arket  imp l i cati ons of 
agents’  psychol ogi cal  t r ait s.  The  str ess on t he ma r ket   i mp l i cati ons i s very i m port ant  because t he analysi s of 
l arge,   com peti t i ve  ma r ket s wi t h  a l ow   l evel  of  str ategic i nt eracti on  i s at  t he  heart   of  econom i cs ( Ma s - Col ell ,
1999) – and,  perhaps not  surpri singl y,  t hi s is the area w here behavi oural fi nance is fi ndi ng hardest  to 
chall enge ma i nst r eam  f i nance.   So  f ar,   t he behavi oural  f i nance l i t erature has not   r eached a l evel  of  ma t uri t y 
wh i ch w oul d all ow  i t   t o provi de a coherent,   uni f i ed t heory of  hum an behavi our  i n ma r ket   cont exts i n t he 
sam e w ay expect ed uti l i t y and m ai nst r eam  econom i cs and fi nance have done.  Ne v e r t hel ess, cum ulati ve 
prospect   t heory  as i nt r oduced  by  Tver sky  and  K ahnem an  ( 1992)  i s approaching  a ma t uri t y  so as t o  r epresent 
a uni f i ed theory of behavi our of agents under ri sk w hich is alt ernat i ve,  and possi bl y (i n som e cont exts) 
superi or,   t o  expected ut i l i t y.  
Thi s paper  wi l l   be str uct ured as f ol l ow s.   The  ensuing secti on wi l l   provi de a f r am ew ork of  analysi s wh i ch 
wi l l  serve as a basis to categori se and i nt erpret the cont r i but i ons i n t he l i t erat ure in a uni f yi ng m anner.  
Subsequent l y,   Secti on  3  provi des  t he  r eader  wi t h  a bi r d’s eye l ook  at  t he  ma i n  “anom ali es” i dent i f i ed i n  t he 
behavi oural fi nance l i t erature. Ther eaft er,  Secti on 4 w i l l  focus on cum ul ati ve prospect  theory w hi ch, as 
me n t i oned above,   ma y   be consi dered t he mo s t   seri ous chall enger  t o expected ut i l i t y as a general  t heory of 
hum an  behavi our  under  r i sk.  Subsequent l y,   t he  debat e bet w een ma i nst r eam  and  behavi oural  f i nance  t heori sts 
on t he i ssue of t he rati onal i t y of t he m arket  as a w hole, as opposed t o t hat  of the i ndi vi dual  ma r ket  
part i cipant s,  i s t ouched upon and assessed i n  Secti on  5.   Fi nal l y,   Secti on  6  wi l l   cont ain  som e suggest i ons f or 
f urt her  r esearch and  som e concl udi ng  r em arks.4
2.   A  f ram ew o rk of   anal ysi s
I t   i s useful   t o i dent i f y t he key elem ents of  analysi s wh i ch wi l l   t urn useful   i n categori sing and assessing t he 
vari ous  cont r i but i ons  i n  t he  behavi oural  f i nance  l i t erature.  As   stated i n  t he  I nt r oduct i on,   t he  ma i n  purpose  of 
t hi s r eview  i s t o  understand  t he  i m pact  of  psychol ogi cal  f actors and  of  “anom ali es” ( see t he  ensuing  secti on 
f or  a precise defi ni t i on  of  “anom aly”)  on aggregat e  ma r ket   pri ces.  Thi s i s by  no  m eans t he  onl y  r eason w hy 
psychol ogi cal  f actors ma y   be  i nt eresti ng  f or  econom i cs
1,   but   i t   mi ght   be  argued  t hat   i t   i s t he  key  one,   and i t   i s 
i n  any  case t he  ma i n  obj ecti ve  of  t he  r eview  of  t hi s paper.  
To  i nt r oduce  som e simp l e t ermi nol ogy,   we   wi l l   r efer  t o rati onal   pri cing  as a f unct i on  defi ned  as f ol l ow s:
) , ( i i x f P =
wh e r e i P  is the pri ce of asset i   set in a com peti t i ve m arket  (i . e.,  a m arket  wi t h a l ow  l evel of str ategic 
i nt eracti on)  at  a cert ain poi nt   i n t i me ,   and f  i s a r elati onshi p ( deri ved f r om  expected ut i l i t y ma x i mi sati on) 
wi t h  a “fundam ent al” val ue  x.   For   exam ple,  i f   P  i s t he  pri ce of  stock i ,f  w oul d  be  t he  di scount ed sum  of  t he 
f ut ure di vi dends  x.   Or ,   i f   P  i s t he  pri ce of  an i nsurance, f  w oul d  be  a ( concave)  f unct i on  t he  payoff s x of  t he 
i nsurance i n  t he  di f f erent  states of  t he  wo r l d.   I t   shoul d  be  em phasi sed t hat   t hi s pri cing  equat i on  i s t he  r esult
of aggregate dem and m at ching aggregate suppl y,  i. e. it  can m ask a considerable heterogenei t y as regards 
i ndi vi dual   i nvest ors’  preferences and expectati ons.   The  pri ce P i s essenti all y t he one f or  wh i ch t he num ber 
( or  bet t er,   t he  m oney)  of  t he  i nvest ors  w ho  dem and  t he  asset  i s t he  sam e as t he  num ber  ( m oney)  of  t hose  w ho 
suppl y i t .  
I n a nut shell ,  advocates of behavi oural f i nance claim t hat  psychol ogi cal f actors and bi ases can oft en
det ermi ne  a devi ati on e f r om   r ati onal   pri cing:
, ) ( i i i e x f P + =
wh e r ee  i s a  pri cing  bi as  t erm ,   not   necessari l y  wh i t e noi se ( i t   w oul d  actual l y  be  uni nt eresti ng  i f   i t   we r e onl y  a 
wh i t e noi se t erm)   and  probabl y  qui t e persistent.   Ma i nst r eam  t heori sts,  by  cont r ast,   t end  t o  claim  t hat   t he  t erm 
e i s,  at  best ,   a t r ansit ory com ponent  wh i ch i s bound t o di sappear  over  t i me   due t o t he pressure of  ma r ket  
f orces.  I t   i s clear  t hat ,   gi ven  t he  com peti t i ve  nat ure of  t he  ma r ket ,   psychol ogi cal  f actors and  bi ases can aff ect 
ma r ket   pri ces onl y  t o  t he  extent  t hat   t hey  are system ati c and  wi del y  spread,  and  t hey  do  not   cancel  out   i n  t he 
aggregate.
A  second el em ent wh i ch is key i n t hi s cont ext is w hether asset pri ces can feedback on the fundam ent als 
t hem sel ves.   Ther efore,  i t   ma k e s   sense also t o consi der  a f eedback relat i onshi p  wh i ch can be sym bol i sed as 
f ol l ow s:
) , ( i i i P g z x + =
1 For  exam ple, Ra bi n (2002b) em phasi ses that  also the al l ocati on achi eved and distr i but i onal  aspects shoul d be of 
i nt erest  t o  econom i sts.  For   exam ple,  even i f   i n a com peti t i ve ma r ket   r ati onal   agents “w ipe out ” i r r ati onal   agents,  as i t   i s 
oft en  argued  by  ma i nst r eam   t heori sts,  econom i cs  shoul d  be  also concerned  wi t h  t he  we l f are  of  t he  ( wi ped  out )   i r r ati onal  
agents.5
wh e r ez  i s an autonom ous com ponent  not  infl uenced by asset  pri ces and g is the feedback funct i on.  For  
i nst ance,  an i ncrease i n t he stock pri ce of  f i r m i   can i ncrease enthusi asm  and confi dence i n t hat   f i r m,   dri ve 
custom ers t o i t s product s,  and ul t i ma t ely self-f ul f i l   t he i ni t i al  enthusi asm ,  even i f   t he i nt r i nsi c qual i t y of  t he 
product   of  f i r m  i ,   i . e.  i z ,   has  not   changed.   Put t i ng  t he  pri cing  and  t he  f eedback equat i ons  t oget her:
i i i i e P g z f P + + = ) ) ( (
Thus,  it  is imme d i ate to see that ,  if  a behavi oural bi as creates a deviati on fr om  rati onal  pri cing and i f  the 
f eedback m echanism  is non-negl i gi bl e, a self-f ul f i l l i ng spi r al can establi sh it self  and bri ng bot h t he asset 
pri ce and  t he  f undam ent al  behi nd  i t   on  a possibl y  t ot all y  unpredictable pat h.   I n  t hi s cont ext,   i t   w oul d  be  clear 
t hat   psychol ogi cal  f actors and bi ases w oul d have an i m port ant  beari ng on we l f are and w oul d t herefore also 
be  of  great  i m port ance t o  econom i sts.
I t  is int eresti ng t o not e that  the i dea that  psychol ogi cal factors m ight  be relevant for ma r ket  pri ces and 
econom i c devel opm ent s i s not   a prerogat i ve of  t he behavi oural  econom ics and f i nance l i t erature,  and has a 
di sti ngui shed past   goi ng  back at  l east  t o  t he  K eynesi an em phasis on  anima l   spir i t s and  t he  r ol e of  uncert aint y 
and  confi dence  i n  shaping  econom i c and  em ploym ent   grow t h.   I n  t he  K eynesi an vi ew ,  t he  econom i c agents’ 
psychol ogy  can be  easil y  di sturbed  and/ or  ma n i pul ated,  and  i t   i s key  i n  t he  econom i c system ,  i n  cont r ast  wi t h 
t he  em phasi s on  r ati onal i t y  wh i ch i s t ypi cal  of  t he  ( now )  ma i nst r eam  approach.  Thus,   i t   mi ght   be  argued  t hat  
t he  f ocus  of  t he  behavi oural  f i nance  l i t erature on  psychol ogi cal  f actors ul t i ma t ely  r epresents a vi ndi cati on  of 
t he  K eynesi an i deas. 
I n t he subsequent  sect i on w e analyse t he m ost  im port ant factors w hich m ight  cont r i but e to create a non-
negl i gi bl e and  persistent  “pri cing  bi as” e i n  t he  pri cing  equat i on.  
3.   A  bi rd ’s  eye  l ook  at   t he  anom al i es
We   defi ne anom al i es t he system ati c  t r ait s of  behavi our  of  econom i c agents,  wh i ch cannot   be expl ained by 
t he expect ed uti l i t y m odel .
2 The l i st of such anom ali es ident i f i ed in t he behavi oural fi nance l i t erature,
especiall y  based  on  experi me n t al  evidence,   i s very  l ong  and  onl y  t he  ma i n  ones  wi l l   be  t ouched  upon  i n  t hi s 
secti on.  For  a m ore com prehensive l i st,  the i nt erested reader ma y  r efer to t he books by K ahnem an and 
Tver sky  ( 2000)  and  Shl eif er  ( 2000).   The  str ess on  t he  system ati c nat ure of  such depart ures ( bi ases)  i s cruci al,  
as otherwi se anom al i es w oul d be of li t t l e int erest,  as every suff i cientl y general theory i n soci al sciences 
shoul d  be  all ow ed  t o  ma k e   mi stakes,  expected ut i l i t y  not   excluded  ( Rubi nst ein,   2000).  
I n t he cont i nuat i on of t hi s survey,  t he presentati on of t he m ost  i m port ant anom al i es w il l  be st r uct ured
according t o four categori es – beari ng i n m i nd t hat  t hi s taxonom y i s arbi t r ary,  t hat  m any ot her
categori sati ons are possibl e, and t hat  there m ay be consi derable overl aps am ong t he categori es. The f our 
categori es are as f ol l ow s:  
2 W e do not  use t he t erm  “anom ali es” to t r i vi ali se them ,  but  to i ndi cate phenom ena w hi ch represent an im port ant 
chall enge  t o  t he  ma i nst r eam  approach based  on  t he  eff i cient  ma r ket s hypot hesi s.  On   t he  possibl y  derogat ory  use  of  t he 
t erm  “anom aly”,   see  Fr ankfurt er  and  M cG oun  ( 2001).6
1. A nom al i es t hat   deri ve f r om  del i berati on and opt i mi sati on costs ( see Col i sk,  1996),   wi t h no r ol e 
pl ayed by em oti ons and “vi sceral” factors. Thi s fi eld broadl y covers the l i t erature on bounded
rati onal i t y;  these anom al i es m ay be l abell ed as “cogni t i ve” depart ures fr om  expect ed uti l i t y 
ma x i mi sati on  ( cogni t i ve  behavi oural  bi ases).
2. A nom al i es w hich are related to t he rol e played by em oti ons and vi sceral f act ors ( see
Loew enstein,   2000).
3. A nom al i es r elated t o choi ce bracketi ng:   i n t hi s category,   anom al i es r elate t o t he f act  t hat ,   wh i l e 
wi t hi n  a cert ain  f r am ed probl em  agents ma y   behave  as t hey  ma x i mi sed expected ut i l i t y,   t he  wa y  
probl em s are f r am ed i nfl uences  t hei r   decisions  t o  a very  signi f i cant  extent  ( f or  a r eview  of  choi ce 
bracketi ng,  see R ead, Loew enstein and Rabi n,  1999).  In part i cular,  it  is com m onl y found t hat  
agents “edit ” probl em s i n narr ow er  f r am es com pared wi t h t he standard ma x i mi sati on of  l i f eti me  
ut i l i t y  popul ar  i n  econom i cs and  f i nance  m odel s.
4. In  t hi s f ourt h  category,   we   survey  r ecent  cont r i but i ons  wh i ch claim  t hat   a set  of  we l l - defi ned  and 
det ermi ni sti c preferences does not  exist.  Ra t her,  stochast i c and cont ext - dependent   preferences 
shoul d  be  consi dered.
Subsequent l y,  in t he next  secti o n  we  wi l l  review  prospect  theory,  wh i ch is consi stent wi t h m ost  of the 
axiom s of the expect ed uti l i t y school  (i ncl udi ng rati onal  expectati ons),  but  wh i ch contains i m port ant new  
elem ents and  wh i ch i s consi stent  wi t h,   and  able t o  gi ve  account   of,   mo s t   of  t he  behavi oural  bi ases i dent i f i ed 
by  t he  l i t erature.  As   such,  and  ow i ng  t o  i t s ma t hem at i cal  t r actabil i t y,   prospect  t heory  i s a seri ous  cont ender  t o 
expected uti l i t y as a general descri pt i ve t heory of hum an behavi our under ri sk and uncert aint y.  The key 
elem ent  of  prospect   t heory  ( and  t he  ma i n  poi nt   of  depart ure f r om   t he  expected ut i l i t y  m odel )   i s i t s reference
dependence,   i . e.  t he i dea t hat   agents’  preferences are not   det ermi ned i n abstr act  t erms ,   but   depend on t he 
specif i c cont ext  and  t he  background  of  t he  decision  probl em  at  hand.
3. 1  Cogni t i ve  behavi our al   bi ases
St andard econom i cs and fi nance m odel s overl ook t he i m port ance of del i berati on /  opt i mi sati on cost s and 
assum e t hat   agents possess absurdl y hi gh com put ati onal   capabil i t i es ( Col i sk,  1996).   I n r eali t y,   del i berati on 
costs can be  a very  i m port ant  elem ent  of  choi ce.  Of t en agents ma k e   r ecourse t o  me n t al  short cuts and  “rul es 
of  t hum b”  wh e n   t he  probl em  t o  solve  i s part i cularl y  com plex and  f ar- r eaching;   such short cuts are know n  i n 
t he  behavi oural  f i nance  l i t erature as decision  heuri sti cs ( K ahnem an  and  Tver sky,   1974).   Mo r e oft en t han  not ,  
such heuri sti cs l ead t o poor decision out com es and invol ve “bl unders” w hich m ight  be el i mi nat ed w it h a 
mo r e “rati onal ” analysi s (i . e.,  an analysi s w here less w eight  we r e att r i but ed to opt i mi sati on cost s).  The 
behavi oural fi nance l i t erature has ident i f i ed a large num ber of system ati c blunders that  pl ague econom i c 
agents,  and  we   wi l l   t ouch  upon  onl y  a f ew .
A v e r y com m on bl under is to m i s-perceive t he l aw s of probabi l i t y,  for exam ple by system ati call y over-
i nferr i ng fr om  sm al l  sam ples (“law  of sm all  num bers”) and underr ate the i m port ance of popul ati on 7
param eters.  Fr am ed i n  t he  cont ext  of  t he  Ba ye s   f ormu l a,  agents t end  t o  system ati call y  overval ue  t he  sam ple 
evidence and syst em ati call y underval ue t he a pri ori  probabi l i t i es. Thi s tendency m ay have an aggregate 
ma r ket  imp l i cati on i f  agents m is-perceive fl uct uat i ons i n pri ces w hich are simp l y due by chance w i t h a 
r eversion t o a m ean ( Ra bi n,   2002a).   For   exam ple,  t he excessive extr apol ati on of  t he past   perf orm ance ma y  
be t he r eason w hy superi or  r eturns are earned by port f ol i os based on publ i cl y avail able dat a ( Lakoni shok,  
Shl eif er,   and  Vi shny,   1994).
Mo r e i n  general,   decision  heuri sti cs ma y   be  i nfl uenced  by  f actors such as vi vi dness  and  “representati veness”,  
wh i ch shoul d have l i t t l e to do w i t h an opt i ma l  decision.  On e  o f  such factors is the anchori ng t o
r epresentati ve val ues w hi ch m ake it  easier for agents to sol ve deci sion probl em s even w hen, if  looked at  
careful l y,  shoul d not  have t he i nfl uence t hey act ual l y have.  A n exam ple of thi s is the fact that  in m ost  
speculati ve  ma r ket s t he  prevail i ng  pri ce i s oft en r egarded  as a ”norma l ” or  “equil i bri um ”  pri ce l evel,   even i f  
agents have no i dea of  wh a t   an “equi l i bri um ” or  “fair ” pri ce mi ght   be ( Mu l l ainat han and Thal er,   2000)  and 
f ut ure devel opm ent s show  that  the m arket  pri ce w as plainl y w rong.  The s ame mi ght  be sai d of m any 
quant i t i es (f or exam ple, the pri ce of any good or servi ce vis-à-vi s any ot her good or servi ce),  wh e r e the 
stat us  quo  i s autom at i call y  t aken as a “natural” val ue  –  t he  com put ati on  of  a t r ul y  nat ural  val ue  w oul d  i n  f act 
i nvol ve t oo hi gh del i berati on cost s.
3 It  is im port ant to st r ess that  these anchori ng eff ects m ay not  be 
ort hogonal   t o  t he  wa y   preferences are f orme d ;   f or  exam ple,  i n  prospect   t heory  ( see l ater  i n  Secti on  4)  gai ns 
and  l osses are defi ned  i n  t erms   of  a reference value  wh i ch i s i n  f act,   i n  mo s t   appl i cati ons,   t he  status  quo.
A  key elem ent  of  bounded r ati onal i t y m odel s i s li mi t ed at t enti on.   Ag e n t s are confr ont ed wi t h a confusi ng 
arr ay of  ( som eti me s   confl i cti ng)  i nforma t i on,   wh i ch encourages t hem  t o f ocus onl y on sali ent  i nforma t i on
( Shi l l er,  2001).
4 Thi s m akes the average hum an being (t he average invest or)  part i cularl y subj ect to fads 
( Shi l l er,   2000b)  and  t o  ma n i pul ati on  by  ot hers ( Da n i el  et  al,   2002).   At   t he  sam e t i me ,   agents t ake t i me   ( due 
t o  l i mi t ed processing  capabil i t y)  t o di gest   new   i nforma t i on,   even wh e n   i t   i s actual l y  r elevant,   wh i ch ma y   l ead 
t o conservati sm  bi as.   Ba r beri s,  Shl eif er  and  Vi shny  ( 1998)  have  devel oped  a m odel   i n  wh i ch agents r eact  i n 
an exaggerate m anner  t o  new   i nforma t i on  due  t o  r epresentati veness  bi as,  wh i l e t he  overr eacti on  i s t em pered 
by  conservat i sm .  As   str essed by  Shi l l er  ( 1998,   2000b,   2001),   att enti on  and  sali ency ma y   have  a social  basi s, 
wh i ch i s t he  r eason w hy  past   pri ce i ncreases ma y   att r act  att enti on  on  a cert ain  f i nanci al  asset  and  det ermi ne  a 
sel f - f ul f i l l i ng  spir al  of  r i sing  pri ce and  i ncreased opt i mi sm ,  unt i l   ul t i ma t ely  t he  bubbl e bust s.
Lack of att enti on m ay al so lead to i nvest or creduli t y ( Da n i el et al,  2002),  wh e r e – ow ing t o l i mi t ed 
com put ati onal   capabil i t i es – agent do not  adequately di scount  for the i ncenti ves of ot hers in m ani pul ati ng 
and presenti ng i nforma t i on.  For  exam ple, i t  has been docum ent ed that  f i r ms  t end t o present posi t i ve 
i nforma t i on  i n  a sali ent  wa y ,   wh i l e t hey  norma l l y  r eport   negat i ve  i nforma t i on  i n  a hi ghl y  non-sali ent  m anner,
3    A  t endency  t o  hi ndsi ght   bi as–  i . e.,   t he  f alse percepti on  t hat   once an event  i s part   of  hi story,   t here i s a t endency  t o 
i nt erpret the sequence as unavoi dabl e – m ay be j ust i f i ed on si mi l ar gounds (see, for exam ple, Ke l ma n ,  Fal l as and 
Fol ger,   1998).   On   hi ndsi ght   bi as i n  f or ecasti ng,   see  f or  exam ple  Fi sher  and  St atma n   ( 2000).
4  On   t he  r ol e of  sali ent  i nforma t i on  and  t he  i r r elevance of  a “rati onal ” we i ghi ng  of  events and  probabi l i t i es,  see Shaf i r  
and  Tver sky  ( 1993).8
but  i nvest ors do not  seem  to t ake thi s factor i nt o account  (Kl i banoff  et al,  1999).  In general,  t he w ay
i nforma t i on  i s presented ma t t ers ( see also Secti on  3. 3  bel ow ).
5
I t   has  been proposed  t hat   expected ut i l i t y  ma x i mi sati on  mi ght   be  am ended,   wi t hout   changi ng i t s f undam ent al 
nat ure,  by addi ng a del i berati on cost  t o t he ut i l i t y f unct i on,   and t hen proceed as i n t he standard approach 
( Col i sk, 1996).
6 Thi s w ay of casti ng bounded rati onal i t y i n t he st andard approach, how ever,  mi ght  be 
probl em ati c for two  r easons. Fi r st,  it  is uncl ear wh a t  precise form t hese del i berati on cost s shoul d have.  
Second,   even assum ing t hat   gi vi ng a det ermi nat e f orm  t o t he del i berati on costs ma y   be possibl e,  a probl em  
of  “infi ni t e r egress” ma y   ari se.  I f   agents have  del i berati on  costs,  t hen  t hey  wi l l   also have  del i berati on  costs i n 
assessing t hei r  del i berati on cost s, and t hus del i berati on cost s on t he del i berati on cost s on t he del i berati on 
costs,  and so on ad i nf i ni t um.   Wh i l e a practi cal  solut i on mi ght   be t o stop t o t he f i r st  del i berati on cost  and 
negl ect  hi gher  order  t erms ,   t hi s solut i on  mi ght   be  unsat i sfactory.
The  appl i cati on of  t he standard expected ut i l i t y ma x i mi sati on t o r eal  wo r l d probl em s i s f urt her  com pli cated 
by t he observat i on t hat  probabi l i t i es are rarely know n t o deci sion-ma k e r s. The decision probl em  then 
becom es t he “m aximi sati on over  a probabi l i t y di str i but i on of  t he probabi l i t y di str i but i on”,   and so on again 
ad i nf i ni t um.  Wh i l e decision probl em s m ay easil y becom e analyt i call y i nt r actable, there is evidence t hat  
agents’  uncert aint y over  t he probabi l i t y di str i but i on has i m port ance consequences.   For   i nst ance,  i t   i s know n 
t hat  agents disli ke “am bi guous” si t uat i ons (i . e.,  sit uat i ons i n w hi ch there is “uncert aint y over t he
uncert aint y”) mo r e than “ri sky” si t uat i ons (wh e r e at least t he uncert aint y i s know n);  Ca me r er and W eber 
( 1992)  provi ded  a very  good  r eview  of  t he  l i t erature on  such “am bigui t y  aversion”.
7
Ov e r all ,   cogni t i ve bi ases mi ght   di stort   asset  pri ces and l ead t o a pri cing bi as t o t he extent  t hat   agents w ho 
dem and a cert ai n asset  are i ncapable t o process t he i nforma t i on underl yi ng a r ati onal   pri cing ( of  t he sam e 
asset) .  If  the cogni t i ve bi ases are suff i cientl y system ati c (e.g. ,  the t endency not  to di scount  for “w indow -
dressing” f i r ms ’   bal ance sheets),   t he ma r ket   as a w hol e m ight   be subj ect  t o bi ases,  and a pri cing bi as mi ght  
r esult .
3. 2  Em ot i onal   and  vi sceral   f act or s  i n  deci si ons
I n m any i nst ances it  has been found t hat  cogni t i ve factors alone cannot  expl ain behavi our in econom i c 
( ma r ket )  cont exts, wh i ch suggest s that em ot i onal  and vi sceral f act ors pl ay an im port ant r ol e (see
Loew enstein,   2000,   and Rome r ,   2000).   A  f am ous exam ple,  f or  i nst ance,  i s t he evidence t hat   t he w eather  i n 
t he  t r ading  l ocati on  i nfl uences  equi t y  pri ces ( Saunders,  1993;   Ka ms t r a et  al,   2000),   presum ably  by  aff ecti ng 
t r aders’ em oti onal  state. The r ol e of em oti ons m ay be part i cularl y i m port ant in si t uat i ons of ri sk and 
uncert aint y,  wh i ch are pervasi ve i n fi nance (Loew enstein et  al,  2001).  A f eature of expected uti l i t y i s, 
5  For   i nst ance,  wh e n   att enti on  and  processing  capabil i t i es  are  l i mi t ed    di sclosi ng  i nform at i on  ma y   actual l y  t urn  out   t o  be 
count erproduct i ve  and  decrease  t r ansparency  ( Da n i el  et  al,   2002,   put   i t   as  “invest ors can  l ose  t he  f orest  f or  t he  t r ees”).
6  For   a  t horough  r eview   of  how   t o  m odel   bounded  r ati onal i t y,   see  Li pm an  (1995).9
i nst ead,  t hat   agents f ace r i sk and uncert aint y f r om  a purely cogni t i ve perspecti ve,   and t hei r   em oti onal   state 
does not   i nfl uence t hei r   decisions alt oget her.   I n r eali t y,   em oti onal   r esponses are ubi qui t ous and ma y   depart  
signi f i cantl y,  som eti me s  d r am ati call y,  fr om  cogni t i ve responses.  In general ,  factors such as vivi dness and 
proxi mi t y i n t i me  p l ay a big rol e in em ot i onal  responses,  wh i l e they shoul d be i r r elevant i n cogni t i ve 
decision  processes.  Expected ut i l i t y  t heori sts ma i nt ain,   how ever,   t hat   at  l east  f r om   a norm at i ve perspecti ve  a 
cogni t i ve r esponse shoul d be preferable,  and t hat   l earni ng and evol ut i on shoul d l ead agents t o i ncreasingl y 
ma k e  r ecourse to cogni t i ve processes and to rely l ess on em ot i ons.  N onet hel ess, a reacti on based on 
em oti ons i s not  necessari l y w orse than a cogni t i ve-based one i f  opt i mi sati on i s costl y (see W il son and 
School er,   1991).
8
Mo s t   anom al i es r elated t o em oti onal   states are based on a t r ade-off   bet w een t he need of  t he sit uat i on ( i . e.,  
ma k i ng opt i ma l  decisions i n a forwa r d-l ooki ng m anner)  and t he necessi t y t o prot ect self-esteem  and
confi dence  as we l l   as t he  em oti onal   we l l bei ng.   On e   of  such anom al i es r elevant  i n  a f i nanci al  ma r ket   cont ext 
i s t he di sposi t i on eff ect ,   nam el y t he r eluct ance t o “declare” l osses t o onesel f   ( f eari ng a l oss of  self-esteem ),
wh i ch pushes  agents t o  hol d  l osi ng  assets t oo  l ong  ( Shef r i n  and  St atma n ,   1985;   O dean,  1998).   A  simi l ar  need 
t o  prot ect  self-esteem  ma y   l ead agents t o bel i ef  perseverance  and  conf i rm atory  bi as:   as t here i s an em oti onal  
cost  associated t o  t he  r ecogni t i on  of  havi ng  been wr ong,   agents t end  t o  l ook  f or  addi t i onal   support   f or  i ni t i al 
hypot heses (Ra bi n and Schrag, 1999) and t o exaggerate corr elati ons w hi ch m ight  be due t o chance,
i nt erpreti ng t hem  i n t he l i ght   of  a preconceived t heory.
9  Thi s f orm  of cogni t i ve di ssonance
10  i s som eti me s
l abell ed as t he “curse of  know l edge” ( Thal er,   2000):   wh e n   we   know  som ethi ng,   we   cannot   i ma g i ne ever  t o 
t hi nk  ot herwi se.  Sel f-esteem  ma y   also l ead t o overconfi dence,   as agents draw  som e em oti onal   gai ns  f r om   t he 
percepti on  of  bei ng  sm art er  t han  ot hers.  Thus ,   t he i dea t hat   peopl e l earn f r om  past   mi stakes –  a hal l ma r k  of 
t he  r ati onal   expectati ons  school   based  on  l earni ng  and  evol ut i onary  r easons ( see Secti on  5  bel ow )  –  ma y   be 
doubt ed if  learni ng i mp l i es a painful  loss of self-esteem  and t he r ecogni t i on not   t o be sm art er  t han ot hers 
( Gr i f f i n and Tversky,  1992).  Thi s form o f  self-enhanci ng bi as m ay expl ain w hy t r ading i s so large i n 
f i nanci al  ma r ket s:  mo s t   ma r ket   part i cipant s mi ght   t hi nk  t o  be  sm art er  t han  t he  average count erpart ,   and  t o  be 
able to m ake m oney fr om  t he fol l y of ot hers (D e Bondt  and Thal er,  1994).  Of  course, m any of them  are 
goi ng  t o  be  di sappoi nt ed ( and  t o  l ose  m oney  due  t o  t r ansacti on  costs),   but   –  again  f or  t he  sake of  t hei r   self-
esteem – wi l l   att r i but e t he  di sappoi nt i ng  out com e j ust   t o  bad  l uck  ( “nature i s against   m e”)  or  ma l i ce f r om   t he 
part  of ot hers (t hi s is unl i kel y i n a l arge m arket ,  how ever) .  Mo r eover,  overconfi dence m ay det ermi ne 
7 The K eynesi an defi ni t i on of uncert aint y and t he related em phasis on confi dence fi t  very w el l  in t hi s str and of
l i t erature.  As   K eynes show ed,   aversion t o am bigui t y and confi dence can have a ma j or  i m pact  on ma r ket   pri ces and on 
econom i c  devel opm ent s.
8 In t hi s respect,  bounded rati onal i t y due t o del i berati on cost s and “gut - f eeli ng” reacti ons are closel y i nt ert wi ned,  
t heoreti call y  and  practi call y.
9  The  “law  of  sm all   num bers”  me n t i oned  above  mi ght   be  part l y  related t o  t hese  t endenci es;  again  bounded  r ati onal i t y 
and  em oti ons  are  closel y  connected.
10  Cogni t i ve  di ssonance  ma y   be  defi ned  as  t he  bi as  of  “fi t t i ng  bel i efs t o  conveni ence”  ( Ra bi n,   1994).10
posi t i ve short -lag autocorr elati ons and negat i ve l ong-l ag autocorr elati ons,   wh i ch are oft en observed i n t he 
data.
11  I n  t hi s r espect,   i t   ma y   aff ect  aggregate ma r ket   pri ces.
On e  p a r t i cularl y i m port ant consequence of the fact that  a decision m ay be em ot i onal l y l oaded i s agents’ 
we i ghi ng of   probabi l i t i es.   The  i dea t hat   agents we i gh states accordi ng t o subj ecti ve probabi l i t i es i n a l i near 
m anner i s an essenti al feature of expected uti l i t y t heory,  but  i t  has been proved w rong i n count l ess 
experi me n t s,  start i ng  wi t h  t he  f am ous  Al l ais paradox.   I n  r eali t y,   agents seem  t o  we i gh  obj ecti ve  probabi l i t i es 
subj ecti vel y,   com put i ng wh a t   i s oft en r eferr ed t o  as t he  subj ecti ve expected val ue.   The  probabi l i t y  we i ghi ng 
f unct i on m ay i n t urn depend t o a si gni f i cant extent on t he agents’ em oti onal  state (see in part i cular 
Loew enstein et  al,  2001),  especiall y on w het her events are “pall i d” or  “vivi d” i n agent s’ percepti on.  For  
i nst ance, K ahnem an and Tversky (1979) not ed that  m ovem ent s in probabi l i t i es around zero and one are 
norma l l y gi ven m uch m ore im port ance than m ovem ent  bet w een, say, . 49 and . 50,  precisely because of 
“vivi dness” consi derati ons (t hi s is oft en referr ed to as t he A l l ais “cert aint y eff ect”).  I n general,  t he 
probabi l i t y we i ghi ng f unct i on t ends t o be f l att er  ( i . e.,   changes i n probabi l i t i es count   l ess wh e n   probabi l i t i es 
are hi gh)  f or  vi vi d out com es,  wh i l e i t   approaches t he l i near  we i ghi ng f or  pal l i d out com es ( nam el y,   events 
t hat   do not   prom pt   an em oti onal   r esponse by agents).   Thus,   a change f r om  0 t o 0. 01 or  f r om  . 99 t o 1 i n t he 
probabi l i t y,  say, to di e in a cert ain year (a very vi vi d and em ot i onal l y l oaded out com e) m ay count  mu c h
mo r e t han  a change f r om   . 30  t o  . 31,   wh i l e t he  sam e . 01  ma r gi nal   change i n  probabi l i t i es w oul d  be  we i ght ed 
i n t he sam e m anner  i f   r eferr ed t o,   say,  a change i n governm ent   i n a di stant  f oreign count r y ( a very pal l i d 
out com e).   Mu c h   experi me n t al  evidence has been gat hered i n t he l ast  decade on t he f unct i onal   f orm  of  t he 
probabi l i t y  we i ghi ng  f unct i on,   say w( p),   and  i t   has  been generall y  f ound  t hat   such f unct i on  i s norma l l y  sub-
addi t i ve  ( i t   i nt egrates t o  a num ber  str i ctl y  sm all er  t han  one),   r egressive  ( w( p)>p  f or  sm all   p,   and  t he  opposi t e 
f or  hi gh p)   and  s-shaped ( f i r st  concave f or  l arge  p,   t hen  convex).
12  Thus,   i n  mo s t   cont exts sm all   probabi l i t i es 
t end  t o  over- we i ghed,   wh i l e l arge  probabi l i t i es t end  t o  be  under- we i ghed  com pared wi t h  t he  l i near  we i ghi ng 
of  expected ut i l i t y.   Ho we v e r ,   f or very sm all   probabi l i t i es,  t he f unct i on becom es i ndet ermi nat e and bot h an 
over- we i ghi ng and an under- we i ghi ng are possibl e (f or inst ance, because a cert aint y eff ect is present) .
13
Tver sky and K ahnem an (1992) and Prelec (1998),  am ong ot hers, have proposed qui t e general funct i onal  
f orms   i n  wh i ch t he  degree of  r egressivi t y  and  of  s-shapeness depends  on  a param eter  or  a set  of  param eters. 
Mu c h   mo r e r esearch i s needed,  how ever,   t o assess t o wh a t   extent  t he nat ure of  a decision probl em  and i t s
bei ng  em oti onal l y  l oaded  i nfl uence  t he  param eters of  t he  chosen  probabi l i t y  we i ghi ng  f unct i on.   I t   i s clear,   i n 
11  Da n i el,   Hi shleif er  and Subra h ma n y a m  ( 1998)  and H ong and St ein  ( 1999)  have bui l t   m odel s based on t he assum pti on
of tr aders’ overconfi dence i n t hei r  pri vat e informa t i on,  wh i ch leads to a (overconfi dent )  mi s- val uat i on and,  fr om  an 
aggregate perspecti ve,   t o  bot h  short-r un  mo me n t um   and  l ong- r un r eversal.   St atma n   and Thorl ey ( 1999)  posi t ,   and f i nd 
em pir i cal confi r ma t i on of the fact,  that  in a bul l  ma r ket ,  wh e r e the overconfi dence of mo s t  invest ors is high,  tr ading 
i ncreases.
12  See i n  part i cular  Tver sky  and  K ahnem an  ( 1992),   Tver sky  and  W akker  ( 1995),   and  Pr elec ( 1998).   Wu   and  G onzalez 
(1996) show ed t hat   t he probabi l i t y w ei ghi ng funct i on i s nonl i near also aw ay fr om  t he boundari es, i. e. fr om  0 and 1,  
suggest i ng  t hat   non- l i neari t y  i s not   onl y  due  t o  t he  cert aint y  eff ect.  
13  I n  som e cases very  sm all   probabi l i t i es are negl ected alt ogher,   so t he  decision  probl em  i s exam ined  wi t hout   r egard  t o 
very  unl i kel y  events.11
any  case,  t hat   a nonl i near  we i ghi ng  of  probabi l i t i es ma y   have  signi f i cant  ma r ket   i mp l i cati ons:   f or  i nst ance,  a 
di sproport i onat e we i ght   att r i but ed t o a very l ow  probabi l i t y of  a catastr ophi c f all   of  t he stock ma r ket   1929-
styl e ( a very  vi vi d  prospect )   has  been proposed  as a possibl e expl anati on  t o  t he  “equi t y  prem ium   puzzle” of 
Me h r a and  Pr escott   ( 1985)  –  see,  f or  exam ple,  Re i z ( 1988).
14  Wu   and  G onzal ez ( 1996)  and  Ca me r er  ( 1998) 
r egard  non-l i near  we i ghi ng  of  probabi l i t i es as an essenti al  elem ent  of  any  descri pt i ve  t heory  of  choi ce under 
r i sk,  t hus  i ncl udi ng  sit uat i ons  of  r elevance f or  f i nance.
On e   of  t he centr al  t enets of  expected ut i l i t y i s t hat   “bygones are bygones” and t he ut i l i t y ma x i mi sati on i s 
alw ays carr i ed out  in a forwa r d-l ooki ng m anner,  wh e r e past experi ences and ri sks taken do not  ma t t er 
alt oget her.   Conversely,   t he  behavi oural  f i nance  l i t erature has  i dent i f i ed a num ber  of  sit uat i ons  i n  wh i ch  past  
devel opm ent s and experi ences do ma t t er  i n det ermi ni ng agents’  preferences and t herefore t hei r   decisions.
15
For   i nst ance,  t he endowm ent   eff ect   ( K ahnem an,   Kn e t sch and Thal er,   1991)  post ul ates t hat   t he di s-ut i l i t y of 
gi vi ng up an obj ect (or an achievem ent,  and so on) is greater than t he ut i l i t y of acqui r i ng i t .  Ther efore, 
agents’  opt i mi sati on  not   onl y  concern  ut i l i t y  f r om ,   say,  w ealt h,   but   also ut i l i t y  of  w ealt h  vi s-à-vi s t he  status 
quo ( by defi ni t i on a backw ard-l ooki ng concept ) .   I n t he sam e vei n,   r i sks born i n t he past   ma y   aff ect  curr ent 
decisions ( M achina,   1989).   The  so-call ed “house m oney” eff ect   ( Thal er  and Johnson,   1990)  sti pul ates t hat  
agents are m ore ri sk averse fol l ow i ng a l oss, and m ore ri sk-lovi ng (or less ri sk-averse) aft er a gain.  The 
behavi oural  expl anati on  of  such phenom enon  i s t hat   wh e n   agents suff er  a pai n  deri vi ng  f r om   a l oss,  have  l ess 
“em oti onal   r eserves” t o t ol erate f urt her  l osses,  wh i l e t hey can “stockpi l e” a cushion of  em oti onal   str engt h 
aft er  a gai n.
16  The  “house m oney” eff ect  can affect  aggregate ma r ket   pri ces.  For   exam ple,  Ba r beri s,  H uang 
and Sant os ( 2001)  show  t hat   t he house m oney eff ect,   t oget her  wi t h l oss aversion ( see Secti on 4 bel ow )  can 
expl ain bot h  t he  equi t y  prem ium   puzzle and  t he  predictabil i t y  of  equi t y  r eturns  at  l ow   f r equency,   phenom ena 
t hat  are dif f i cult  – al bei t  not  im possibl e – to expl ain i n m ai nst r eam  fi nance.  Regr et  theory ( Loom es and 
Sugden,   1982)  and di sappoi nt me n t   aversion  ( Gu l ,   1991)  are bot h  based  on  t he  i dea t hat   agents val ue  ( eit her 
i n a backw ard-l ooki ng or in a forwa r d-l ooki ng m anner)  the em ot i onal  cost of bei ng di sappoi nt ed and of 
havi ng  ma d e   a mi stake wh i ch t hey  mi ght   have  avoi ded.
17  The  relevance of   sunk  costs ( Thal er,   1991)  i s also 
r elated t o  t hi s att i t ude:   som eti me s   we   t hi nk  t hat   we   have  “too  mu c h   i nvest ed t o  qui t ”,  and  t hi s mi ght   l ead t o 
14    For   a  r eview   of  t he  solut i ons  proposed  t o  t he  equi t y  prem ium   puzzle,  see  Si egel  and  Thal er  ( 1997).
15 The i m port ance of backw ard- l ooki ng consi derati ons has been recentl y recogni sed also in m ai nst r eam  fi nance and
econom i cs  wi t h  t he  recent  em phasi s on  habi t   f orm at i on  ( see  f or  exam ple  Cha pma n,   1998,   and  M essini s,  1999).  
16 By cont r ast,  Go me s  ( 2000) proposed a m odel  in w hi ch invest ors are m ore w il l i ng t o t ake ri sks aft er a loss, wh i l e 
bei ng  mo r e conservat i ve  aft er  a gain.   Af t er  a l oss,  agents are wi l l i ng t o “gam ble f or  r esurr ecti on”,   wh i l e aft er  a gai n,  
t hey  wa n t   t o  prot ect  t hei r   achievem ent.   Thus,   i nvest ors t end  t o  sell   wi nners and  t o  hol d  on  t o  l osers,  consi stent  wi t h  t he 
di sposi t i on eff ect.  A ccordi ng t o G om es (2000),  het erogenei t y i n ri sk att i t udes due t o past  hi story of invest ors (i . e.,  
wh e t her  t hey  have  previousl y  experi enced  gai ns  or  l osses)  can  also expl ain  t r ading  i n  f i nanci al  ma r ket s. 
17  A ng,   B ekaert   and Li u ( 2000)  use di sappoi nt me n t   t heory t o solve t he puzzle  of  w hy  agents f i nd  stocks  di sappoi nt i ng 
but  buy l ot t ery t i ckets. Re t urns on st ocks are li kel y t o di sappoi nt  invest ors precisely because they have a posi t i ve 
expected val ue,   wh i ch f eeds t hrough  t o  agents’  expectati ons.   Ther efore,  t he  probabi l i t y  of  bei ng  di sappoi nt ed by  stocks 
i s high.  In l ot t eri es, agents expect to l ose m oney w i t h vi r t ual  cert aint y and m ay onl y be posi t i vel y surpri sed by t he 
out com e.  Thi s m echanism  w oul d  expl ain  w hy  l ot t ery  t i ckets are  so mu c h   i n  dem and.12
excessive  r i sk-t aking  and,   mo r e i n  general,   t o  sub-opt i ma l   choi ces ( t he  r elevance of  sunk  costs i ncreases,  of 
course,  wi t h  t he  em oti onal   i nvest me n t   associated t o  t hese  costs).  
Fi nal l y,m oral   f eeli ngs m ay al so infl uence preferences and behavi our.   For   i nst ance,  t he r ol e of  f eeli ngs of 
reciprocat i on ( wh e n   posi t i ve)  and ret al i at i on (w hen negat i ve) have been st udi ed in gam e t heory cont exts 
( K ahnem an,   Kn e t sch and  Thal er,   1986).
18  Ho we v e r ,   wh i l e i t   i s clear  t hat   such f eeli ngs  ma y   i nfl uence  t r ading 
i n  str ategic cont exts wi t h  a l ow   num ber  of  agents,  i t   i s doubt f ul   t hat   t hey  mi ght   be  r elevant  i n  t he  cont ext  of  a 
ma r ket  wi t h a l arge num ber of part i cipant s and a l ow  l evel of str ategic int eracti on.  The ver y t endency of 
agents to t he “representati veness” heuri sti c ( see above) – nam el y t o consi der  t he curr ent  ma r ket   pri ces as 
“fair ”–   i s l i kel y t o keep mo r al  f eeli ngs out   of  t he ma r ket pl ace.
19  The  sam e probabl y hol ds t r ue f or  “cari ng 
about   t he  ot hers” ( Ra bi n,   2002b).
3. 3  Choi ce  bracket i ng  and nar r ow f ram ing
A  key feature of t he expect ed uti l i t y approach, i ncl udi ng i t s appl i cati ons i n m ai nst r eam  fi nance,  i s the 
i ndependence axi om:  agents’ preferences and thei r  choi ces are independent  of how  a decision probl em  is 
descri bed  or  presented.  Conversel y,   t he  behavi oural  f i nance  l i t erature has  f ound  a num ber  of  i m port ant  cases 
i n  wh i ch t he  wa y   a cert ain  decision  probl em  i s presented ma t t ers ( nam el y,   t he  i ndependence  axiom   does  not  
hol d).F r a mi ng and el i cit at i on ef f ects (Tver sky and Thal er,  1990) perm eate t he behavi oural f i nance
l i t erature,  and narrow f ram ing i s i n part i cular  one of  i t s mi l estones.   Fr am ing ma y   be a r elevant  f actor  not  
onl y  at  i ndi vi dual   l evel,   but   also at  a m acro  l evel;   f or  i nst ance,  Shaf f r ,   Di am ond  and  Tver sky  ( 1997)  expl ain 
m oney i l l usi on  as t he  t endency  t o  f r am e econom i c quant i t i es i n  nom i nal   t erms ,   wh i ch happens  at  l ow   l evels 
of infl ati on,  refl ecti ng t he exi stence of com put ati onal  costs. Conversely,  at hi gh l evels of infl ati on agents 
f i nd i t   opt i ma l   t o m easure econom i c phenom ena i n r eal   t erms .   The  f act  t hat   t he adjust me n t   f or  i nfl ati on i s 
som eti me s   done i ncorr ectl y and t hat   t he err or  i s system ati c ( l ow  i nfl ati on i s consi dered t o be zero i nfl ati on) 
l eads t o  t he  concl usi on  t hat   m oney  i l l usi on  can i ndeed aff ect  ma r ket   pri ces ( i n  part i cular,   i nt erest  r ates mi ght  
be  di stort ed upw ards).
Choi ce bracketi ng  can be  defi ned  as “a seri es of  l ocal  choi ces t hat   each appear  t o  be  advant ageous but   wh i ch 
coll ecti vel y l ead t o a bad gl obal   out com e” ( R ead,  Loew enstein and Ra bi n,   1999)  and i t   i s closel y r elat ed t o 
narrow  f ram ing  as i nt r oduced  by  Thal er  ( 1980).   U nder  choi ce bracketi ng  /   narr ow   f r am ing,   agents ma x i mi se 
ut i l i t yl ocal l y  i n an opt i ma l   m anner,   but   by doi ng so t hey ma y   com e t o a di sastr ous gl obalout com e.  The 
mo s t   not ori ous f orm  of  narr ow  f r am ing i s procrast i nat i on.   U nder  procrasti nat i on,   agents act  on t he basi s of 
r ati onal  calculati ons at  int erval s that  are ir r ati onal l y short .  Thus,  wh i l e they m axi mi se thei r  ut i l i t y i n t he 
short - t erm,  they m ay end up i n very unsat i sfactory and sub-opt i ma l   sit uat i ons over a long hori zon.  On e  
classic exam ple is the deci sion of wh e n  t o qui t  sm oki ng:  on a gi ven day,  the sacri f i ce to refr ain fr om  
sm oki ng wi l l   alwa y s   be greater  t han t he ( negl i gi bl e)  ut i l i t y i n t erms   of  bet t er  healt h on t he sam e day.   Ye t ,  
18  For   a  r eview   of  r eciproci t y  i n  econom i cs,  see Fehr   and  G ächter  ( 1998).  13
aft er runni ng t hi s opt i mi sati on over and over for thousands of days and al wa y s  – l ocall y,  in an opt i ma l  
m anner– choosi ng not  to qui t  sm oki ng,  the l ong-t erm  consequences f or  healt h can becom e catastr ophi c.
20
Thi s ki nd of  behavi our  –  all   t oo  f am il i ar  i n  everyday  l i f e –  signal s t hat   hum an  pat i ence i s not   i ndependent   of 
t he hori zon and t hat  preferences are not  ti me - consi stent.
21 Ak e r l of (1991) referr ed to t hi s tendency as 
hyperbol i c di scount i ng.  In m ai nst r eam  expected uti l i t y,  di scount i ng i s exponent i al and i t  is independent  of 










wh e r e j U   r epresents ut i l i t y at  t i me  j ,E  i s t he expectati on operator,   and  b   i s a num ber  bet w een zero and 
one.   By  cont r ast,   under  hyperbol i c di scount i ng  agents’  i mp a t i ence i s steeper  f or  near- t erm  t r adeoff s t han  f or 
l ong-t erm  t r adeoff s.  A  conveni ent  one-param eter  approxi ma t i on  of  hyperbol i c di scount i ng  i s t he  f ol l ow i ng:
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wi t h 1 0 < <a ;   f or  1 = a ,   exponent i al  di scount i ng  i s r ecovered.  Thus,   agents ma x i mi se:
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wh i ch l eads t o  dynam i call y  i nconsi stent  preferences ( I   wi l l   not   do  t om orr ow   wh a t   I   now   assum e I   wi l l   do).
22
These preferences ma y   cert ainl y  be  undesi r able f r om   a norma t i ve  perspecti ve  ( agents shoul d  t ake t hei r   f ut ure 
preferences i nt o account   i n ma x i mi sing t hei r   l i f eti me   ut i l i t y),   but   t hey are descri pt i vel y ubi qui t ous.   A  qui t e 
l arge body of l i t erature is devel opi ng on procrasti nat i on and on w ays t o overcom e it  (see for exam ple 
O’ D onoghue  and  Ra bi n,   1999a,   1999b  and  2001,   Br ocas and  Ca r r i l l o,   2000,   and  Fi scher,   2001).  
H abi t   f orm at i on i s anot her  area wh e r e broad bracketi ng w oul d l ead t o opt i ma l   gl obal   out com es and wh e r e 
agents oft en li mi t  t hem sel ves (and t hei r  we l f are) due t o narr ow  bracketi ng.  For  exam ple, opt i ma l  habi t  
f orma t i on for tastes requi r es to bracket toget her past  and fut ure experi ences, and t he short - t erm c o s t  of 
acqui r i ng a t aste mo r e oft en t han not   out we i ghs t he short - t erm  benefi t s (f or inst ance,  l earni ng t o pl ay gol f  
i nvol ves  put t i ng  up  a short - t erm  eff ort ,   wh i ch i s t ol erated onl y  i f   our  agent  l ooks  at  t he  l ong-t erm  gai ns  f r om  
pl aying i t ) .  
Wh i l e in som e l i mi t ed inst ances narr ow  bracketi ng m ay be opt i ma l  (f or exam ple, l ooki ng at  a cert ain 
unpleasant  t ask “a pi ece at  t he t i m e” ma y   i ncrease t he agent’ s det ermi nat i on t o carr y i t   out ,   wi t hout   bei ng 
19 Thi s is not  necessari l y t r ue i n ot her cont exts, for exam ple the l abour ma r ket  (f or an im port ant appl i cati on of the 
concept  of  r eciproci t y  t o  explain  d o wn wa r d  nom i nal   wa g e   r i gi di t y  i n  t he  l abour  ma r ket ,   see Be wl ey,  1995).
20  D ecidi ng  wh e n   t o  start   a  di et  i s,  of  course,  anot her  classic  exam ple.
21 O’ D onoghue and Rabi n (1999b) report  the exam ple that  agents m ay pay not  to ant i cipat e a cert ain unpl easant task 
f r om  t om orr ow  t o t oday,  but  they are indi f f erent bet w een one day i n si x m ont hs t i m e and t he day before. Wh i l e thi s 
behavi our is int ui t i vel y nat ural,  it  is in cont r ast wi t h expect ed uti l i t y based on exponent i al sm oot hi ng.  Mo r eover,  
O’ D onoghue and Rabi n show  t hat  sm all  quant i t i es are norma l l y di scount ed m ore heavil y t han l arge quant i t i es, and 
l osses mo r e   t han  gai ns.
22  See  Ca i l l aud  and  Jull i en  ( 2000).14
scared off ) ,   i t   generall y l eads t o sub-opt i ma l   out com es.  The  next   nat ural  quest i on  i s t hus  w hy  agents t end  t o 
f r am e t hei r   decision probl em s so narr ow l y and t o negl ect  t he corr elati ons am ong di f f erent  aspects or  t i me  
hori zons i n t hei r   l i ves.   Pr esum ably,   cogni t i ve l i mi t ati ons and del i berati on costs as r eferr ed t o above pl ay a 
ma j or  r ol e i n  expl aini ng  narr ow   f r am ing  ( see R ead,  Loew enstein  and  Ra bi n,   1999).
I s narr ow  bracketi ng r elevant  f r om  an aggregate ma r ket   perspecti ve? Ther e i s som e i ndi cati on t hat   i t   mi ght  
be so.  Mo s t  not ably,  Be na r t zi and Thal er (1995) provi ded w hat  is by now  one of the m ost  convi nci ng 
expl anati ons  of  t he  equi t y  prem ium   puzzle of  Me h r a   and  Pr escott   ( 1985),   by  r elati ng  t he  hi gh  r i sk prem ium  
r equest ed on  equi t y  t o  a m yopi c  l oss aversion  of  equi t y  hol ders.  I nst ead on  f ocusi ng  on  t hei r   l i f eti me   ut i l i t y 
and  not i ng  t hat   over  t he  l ong-t erm  equi t y  i s t he  mo s t   profi t able i nvest me n t   by  a wi de  ma r gi n  ( see Si egel  and 
Thal er,  1997),  agents fr am e thei r  invest me n t  decision m ore narr ow l y t o an hori zon of approxi ma t ely one 
year,   at  wh i ch t he r i sk t hat   stocks under- perf orms   bonds i s i ndeed hi gh.   As   agents are also hi ghl y averse t o 
l osses, thi s leads to a hi gh ri sk prem ium  and a sub-opt i ma l  under- i nvest me n t  in equi t y,  a tendency w i t h 
i m port ant  consequence f r om  a m acroeconom i c standpoi nt .
23  Ba r beri s and H uang ( 2001)  provi ded a f urt her 
r efi nem ent  of t hi s analysi s, by di sti ngui shing narr ow  fr am ing on t he equi ty port f ol i o and on i ndi vi dual  
stocks.
24
3. 4  St ochast i c  and  unknown  pr ef erences
Som e  cont r i but i ons i n t he behavi oural  f i nance l i t erature have poi nt ed out   t hat   post ul ati ng t he existence of 
predetermi ned,   we l l - defi ned preferences underl yi ng agents’  decision i n a vari ety of  cont exts and sit uat i ons 
m ay be far- f etched, if  not  pl ainl y false. In a num ber of experi me n t s as w ell  as in real wo r l d si t uat i ons 
preference r eversals have  been observed,   and  i n  general  preferences seem  t o  depend  t o  a l arge  extent  on  t he 
wa y   a cert ain  ( econom i c)  decision  probl em  i s presented t o  agents ( St arme r ,   2000).   Pr eference r eversals ma y  
i mp l y t hat   t he pri nci pl e of  t r ansit i vi t y ( i f  x i s preferr ed t o y and y i s preferr ed t o z,   t hen x i s preferr ed t o z)
ma y   be  vi ol ated ( x  i s preferr ed t o  y  and y i s preferr ed t o z,  but   z i s preferr ed t o  x,   f or  i nst ance i f   i t   i s presented 
i n  a di f f erent  m anner  t han x).
The  concept  of  ut i l i t y i n ma i nst r eam  econom i cs and f i nance i s also seen as uncl ear.   K ahnem an ( 1994)  i n 
part i cular  em phasi sed t hat   i t   needs t o be  di sti ngui shed at  l east  bet w een hedoni c experience ( ex post )   and  t he 
ex ante concept  of  decision  ut i l i t y.   No t   necessari l y,   and  actual l y  qui t e seldom ,   i s t he  l att er  a good  predictor  of 
t he f orme r   because agents ma y   be poor  at  f orecasti ng t hei r   ow n t astes.  On e   com m onl y observed t endency,  
f or inst ance, is for agents to system ati call y underesti ma t e the degree to w hi ch they w i l l  adapt to a new  
sit uat i on,   l eading t hem  t o exaggerate t he ut i l i t y gai n or  l oss deri vi ng f r om  a cert ain out com e di f f erent  f r om  
t he  stat us  quo  ( hedoni c mi s-predicti on).Rem em bered  ut i l i t y  ma y   pl ay an i m port ant  r ol e i n f orecasti ng f ut ure 
23  M yopi c  behavi our  w oul d  also solve  t he  celebre  “fall acy  of  l arge  num bers” of  Sam uel son  ( 1963).
24  Shef r i n  and  St atma n   ( 1994,   2000)  have  proposed  a “behavioural  port f ol i o  t heory”  based  on  t he  i dea t hat   peopl e keep 
t hei r   port f ol i os i n separate me n t al  account s:  som e m oney i s r eti r em ent  m oney,   som e i s f un m oney,   som e i s dow nsi de 
prot ecti on,  som e a shot at becom ing ri ch. These m ental account s are considered in i solati on and covari ances am ong 15
t astes (t hus i n deci sion ut i l i t y),  but  me mo r y can also play tr i cks on agents. Fur t hermo r e, ut i l i t y m ay be 
deri ved fr o m me mo r y i n i t self  ( El ster and Loew enstein,  1992),  again i mp a r t i ng a backw ard-l ooki ng
ori entati on t o agents’ decisions.  I n general,  t hi s li t erature em phasises the l i nkages bet w een the past
( me mo r y),   t he  present  ( decision  ut i l i t y)  and  t he  f ut ure ( f ut ure experi enced ut i l i t y).   The  expectati on  of  f ut ure
experi enced ut i l i t y i s not   alwa y s   assessed onl y cogni t i vel y,   but   i s also accom panied by str ong anti cipat ory 
f eeli ngs such as anxi ety ( Ca pl i n and Leahy,   2001).
25  Mo r eover,   preferences evol ve over  t i me ,   f or  i nst ance 
wi t h  age,  but   agents seldom   t ake t hi s f actor  i nt o  account   i n  t hei r   decisions  ( again,   a del i berati on  cost  ma y   be 
at  t he  r oot   of  t hi s t endency).  
On e  i nt eresti ng approach, wh i ch is how ever seldom  fol l ow ed t hus far especiall y ow i ng t o com put ati onal  
costs, is to post ul ate that  preferences, especiall y f ut ure preferences,  are stochast i c f or  t he agent  w ho mu s t  
t ake a decision ( see f or  exam ple He y ,   1995,   and Loomes ,   1995).   Ha r l ess and Ca me r er  ( 1994)  deal  wi t h t he 
i ssue of  how  t o esti ma t e ( r eveal)   preferences wh e n   an err or  t erm  i s i ncl uded i n t hem .   Ho we v e r ,   i t   i s l i kel y 
t hat   uncert aint y over  ow n preferences –  especiall y f ut ure ones – i s mu c h   mo r e pervasi ve and deeply r oot ed 
t han t he m ere incl usi on of an err or t erm  w oul d i mp l y.  N onet hel ess, stochast i c preferences represent an
i nt eresti ng  step f orwa r d  as t hey  hi ghl i ght   t he  i dea t hat   f orecasti ng  f ut ure t astes and  l i nki ng  t hem   t o  me mo r y 
i s a key  elem ent  i n  i ndi vi dual   decision-ma k i ng,   as basi c psychol ogi cal  i nt ui t i on  w oul d  suggest .  
Ar e stochast i c preferences relevant in a m arket  cont ext? Especiall y t he evi dence on preference reversals 
r eview ed in Tversky and Thal er (1990) does suggest  so. It  has been found experi me n t all y t hat  di f f erent 
me t hods of eli cit i ng preferences oft en give ri se to system ati call y di f f erent orderi ngs am ong possi bl e 
alt ernat i ves.   For   i nst ance,  a system ati c t endency  has  been observed  t o  overpri ce l ow   probabi l i t y  /   hi gh  payoff  
l ot t eri es over  hi gh probabi l i t y /   l ow  payoff   l ot t eri es ( com pared wi t h t he orderi ng obt ained t hrough a di r ect 
com pari son bet w een t hese alt ernat i ves).   As   Tver sky and Thal er  ( 1990)  put   i t ,   “if   opt i on A  i s pri ced hi gher 
t han opt i on B,   we   cannot   alwa y s   assum e t hat   A  i s preferr ed t o B  i n di r ect  com pari son”.   I n simp l er  wo r ds,  
ma r ket  behavi our does not  necessari l y refl ect the m axi mi sati on of we l l -defi ned preferences; indeed, it  is 
t hi nki ng i n m onet ary t erms   wh i ch changes t hose very preferences.  The  consequences of  t hese f i ndi ngs f or 
econom i cs and  f i nance  can be  of  cruci al  i m port ance,  as i t   i s easy t o  f i gure out .   For   i nst ance,  t he  i dea t hat   t he 
ma r ket   all ocates r esources t o  t hei r best   possibl e use  w oul d  be  undermi ned  i f   agents’  preferences are aff ected 
by  t he  ma r ket   m echanism  i t self .
me n t al account s are ignored. In t hi s respect,  there is no uni f i ed port f ol i o t heory as i n m ai nst r eam  fi nance,  but  rather 
m any  port f ol i o  t heori es  accordi ng  t o  t he  narr ow l y  f r am ed  port f ol i o  selecti on  probl em   ( St atma n ,   1999).
25 Ca pl i n and Leahy (2001) put  forwa r d t he i dea that  anxi ety m i ght  be t he root  of ri sk aversion.  At  the sam e t i me ,  
anxi ety can dri ve deci sions i n a very di f f erent wa y  t han i n st andard expect ed uti l i t y m odel s, for inst ance by causing 
extr em e f orms   of  nonl i near  we i ghi ng  of  probabi l i t i es.16
4.   A  chal l enger   t o  expect ed  ut i l i t y:   cum ul at i ve  pr ospect   t heor y
A ccordi ng t o l eading behavi oural  f i nance t heori sts such as Thal er  ( 2000)  and Ca me r er  ( 1998),   cum ulati ve 
prospect  theory i s a key cont ender to expect ed uti l i t y as a descri pt i ve t heory of behavi our under ri sk. 
De v e l oped by K ahnem an and Tver sky i n t he sevent i es,  t he t heory wa s   honed i n t he earl y ni net i es ( Tver sky 
and K ahnem an,  1992) and has  received a great deal of em pir i cal support  especiall y i n experi me n t al
econom i cs ( K ahnem an  and  Tver sky,   2000).   On e   ma j or  advant age of  prospect   t heory  over  expected ut i l i t y  i s 
t hat   i t   has no aspir ati ons as a norma t i ve t heory of  behavi our;   i t   simp l y descri bes i n t he mo s t   parsim oni ous 
and  analyt i call y  t r actable m anner  agents’  observed  behavi our  ( Ba r beri s and  Thal er,   2001).
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Pr ospect  theory i s fi r ml y grounded as a key pi l l ar of the behavi oural fi nance l i t erature, but  it  depart s 
som ew hat  f r om   t he  behavi oural  bi ases  l i t erature f or  i t s bei ng  consi stent  wi t h  r ati onal   behavi our  as norma l l y 
defi ned i n t he m ai nst r eam  approach. The key new  el em ent of prospect  theory com pared w it h expect ed
ut i l i t y,   as alr eady  not ed above,   i s i t s reference dependence.   Pr eferences  are  not   r epresented by  an i mmu t able 
ut i l i t y  f unct i on  but   r ather  depend  on  t he  sit uat i on  and  t he  agent’ s expectati ons  and  norms .
Wh i l e prospect  t heory has received a great deal of em pir i cal support ,  i t s ori gi ns com e fr om  basi c
psychol ogi cal  i nt ui t i on.   The  t heory i s based  on  t hree axiom s:
1. O rgani sm s habi t uat e t o  steady  states ( adapt at i on);
2. The m argi nal   r esponse  t o  changes i s di mi ni shing;
3. Pain  i s mo r e urgent   t han pl easure.
The  f i r st  axiom   states t hat   agents do  not   l ook  at  w ealt h –  or  vari ables of  simi l ar  econom i c si gni f i cance – per
se,  but   r ather  com pared t o a reference poi nt ,   wh i ch i s oft en t he status quo t o wh i ch t hey are used ( t o wh i ch 
t hey have adapted t hem sel ves
27) .   Ther efore, changes r ather  t han l evels i n w ealt h ma t t er  i n agents’  ut i l i t y –
t hi s is indeed the si ngl e m ost i m port ant di f f erence betw een prospect  t heory and expect ed uti l i t y.  I n
part i cular,   gai ns  com pared wi t h  t he  r eference poi nt   are carr i ers of  posi t i ve  ut i l i t y,   wh i l e l osses are carr i ers of 
negat i ve  ut i l i t y.
A  consequence  of  t he  second  axiom   of  t he  t heory  i s t hat   agents evaluat e depart ures f r om   t he  r eference poi nt  
i n  eit her  di r ecti on  wi t h di mi ni shing  sensit i vit y.   For   exam ple,  a 1%   ma r g i nal   change i n  w ealt h  at  t he  r eference 
poi nt   i s mo r e i m port ant  t han a ma r gi nal   change 30%  aw ay f r om  t he r eference poi nt  (i n ot her  wo r ds,   agents 
perceive  mo r e str ongl y  a change f r om   0%   t o  1%   –  posi t i vel y  or  negat i vel y –  t han  a change f r om   30%   t o  31%  
i f   t he  r eference poi nt   i s zero,   i r r especti ve  of  wh e t her  t he  change i s a l oss or  a gai n).   I n  expected ut i l i t y  t here 
i s no  r eference val ue,   but   i f   one  t akes t he  status  quo  as a ( pseudo-) r eference poi nt ,   t he  concavit y  of  t he  ut i l i t y 
f unct i on i mp l i es t he opposi t e t endency f or  l osses,  nam el y a ma r gi nal   l oss f r om  30%  t o 31%  i s – unl i ke i n 
prospect   t heory –mo r e   seri ous  t han  a ma r gi nal   l oss f r om   0%   t o  1% .   Thus,   wh i l e expected ut i l i t y  agents are 
26 On  t he ot her hand,  the fact that  prospect  theory i s closed t o norma t i ve analysi s m ight  also be int erpreted as a 
l i mi t ati on  of  t he  t heory.
27  See  Sam uel son  and  Zeckhauser  (1988)  on  adaptati on  and  t he  status  quo  bi as.17
i mp l i cit l y  r i sk averse f or  l osses,  prospect   t heory  agents are generall y  r i sk seeking  f or  l osses.  Thi s i s again  an 
i m port ant  di f f erence bet w een prospect   t heory  and  t he  standard  approach.
Fi nal l y,   t he t hi r d axiom  post ul ates t han l osses l oom  l arger  t han gai ns i n agents’  ut i l i t y,   wh i ch i s norma l l y 
r eferr ed t o as loss aversion.   I n m any experi me n t s i t   has been f ound t hat   l osses are carr i er  of  a di s-ut i l i t y of 
approxi ma t ely t wo   t i me s   t he ut i l i t y of  a gai n of  t he sam e size.  I n t he standard approach,  gai ns and l osses 
cannot   be  defi ned  because of  t he  absence of  a r eference val ue  against   wh i ch t o  me a s u r e t hem .   Ne v e r t hel ess, 
t he m ean-vari ance ut i l i t y f unct i on com m onl y used i n t heoreti cal  f i nance i mp l i cit l y assum es t hat   agents care 
about   devi ati ons  f r om   t he  expected r eturn  on  a cert ain  asset  ( or  port f ol i o  of  assets),   wh i ch de  f act o  pl ays t he 
r ol e of  a r eference poi nt ,   as alr eady hi nt ed above.
28  The  m ean-vari ance ut i l i t y f unct i on,   how ever,   does not  
di sti ngui sh betwe e n  g a i ns and l osses and assum es an increasi ng,  rather t han decreasing sensi t i vi t y t o 
depart ures f r om   t he  expected val ue.  
I n  prospect   t heory,   t he  choi ce i s r epresented by  a t wo - stage process.  Fi r st,   t he  probl em  i s “edit ed”,  possibl y 
usi ng a form o f  decision heuri sti c and in t he cont ext of a narr ow  fr am ing.  For  exam ple, the agent wi l l  
narr ow -f r am e t he  probl em  “how   t o  i nvest   a cert ain  am ount   of  m oney”  and  const r uct   a r eference poi nt   around 
wh i ch to evaluat e gains and l osses (f or inst ance, the i ni t i al level of w ealt h).   The  agent  wi l l   not   l ook at  t he 
corr elati ons  bet w een t hi s part i cular  decision  and  ot her  aspects of  hi s l i f e,  because of  del i berati on  costs.  I n  a 
second  stage,  t he  agent  t akes t he  decision  ( e.g. ,   how   mu c h   w ealt h  t o  i nvest   i n  equi t y)  so as t o  ma x i mi se t he 
prospect i ve  value  f unct i on  ( K ahnem an  and  Tver sky,   1979).  
To be abl e to bui l d and m axi mi se the prospect i ve val ue funct i on,  the agent mu s t  fi r st consi der hi s value














wh e r ex   i s a   depart ure of  t he vari able of  i nt erest  f r om  t he r eference poi nt ,   and a and b are r eal  scalars such 
t ha t0<a<1 a ndb>1.  A v a l ue of the param eter b greater than one capt ures the i dea that  losses are m ore 
i m port ant  t han  gai ns  ( l oss aversion),   wh i l e a<1  captures  t he  propert y  of  di mi ni shing  sensit i vi t y  t o  gai ns  and 
l osses.  Thus,   t he  val ue  f unct i on  i s concave on  gai ns  and  convex  on  l osses ( i . e.,   i t   i s not   concave everyw here 
as i n expected ut i l i t y t heory).   Thus,   t hi s val ue f unct i on posi t s t hat   agents are r i sk averse f or  gai ns and r i sk 
l over f or l osses. These features of t he val ue funct i on have been generall y confi r me d  i n l aboratory
experi me n t s ( see,  f or  i nst ance,  Tver sky  and  K ahnem an,   1992).  
I n  order  t o  obt ain  t he  prospect i ve  val ue  f unct i on,   t he  agent  mu s t   we i gh  t he  val ue  f unct i on  i n  di f f erent  states 
of  t he wo r l d accordi ng t o som e m easure of  probabi l i t y associated t o t hese states.  I n t he ori gi nal   version of 
28  On   t he  ot her  hand,   i t   i s wo r t h  str essing  t hat   prospect   t heory  ma y   be  r ew ri t t en as a f unct i on  of  t he  l evel  of  w ealt h  ( see 
A ng,  B ekaert  and Li u,  2000).  Mo r eover,  di sappoi nt me n t  aversion as i n G ul  (1991) imp l i es an endogenous reference 
poi nt  gi ven by t he certaint y equi val ent of t he l ot t ery.  U nder di sappoi nt me n t  aversion,  the i dea that  agents value 
di f f erentl y  gai ns  and  l osses i s ma i nt ained,   but   unl i ke  i n  prospect   t heory  t he  r eference poi nt   i s det ermi ned  endogenousl y.  
De s p i t e thi s att r acti ve feature, di sappoi nt me n t  aversion t heory has not   gai ned t he sam e popul ari t y of  prospect   t heory 
t hus  f ar.18
t he  t heory  ( K ahnem an  and  Tver sky,   1979),   agents consi der  a nonl i near  we i ghi ng  f unct i on  of  t he  probabi l i t y 
densi t y  of  t he  out com e.  The  prospect i ve  val ue  f unct i on  ( PVF)   i s t hus  obt ained  as f ol l ow s:
PVF=∫ dx x p w x V) ) ( ( ) (
As  me n t i oned above,  the probabi l i t y w ei ghi ng funct i on put  forwa r d i n t he behavi oural fi nance l i t erature 
( w( p))   i s generall y  r egressive  and  s-shaped.
I n  t he  advanced  version  of  prospect   t heory,   cum ulat i ve prospect   t heory  ( Tver sky  and  K ahnem an,   1992),   t he 
we i ghi ng  f unct i on  i s defi ned  on  t he  cum ulati ve  probabi l i t y  densi t y  of  gai ns  and  l osses separately,   r ather  t han 
on t he probabi l i t y densi t y.  Thus,  events are rated accordi ng t o t hei r  rank (r ank-dependent ;  see Q uiggi n,  
1982)  i n  t he  possibl e r ange  of  events.  The  probabi l i t y  we i ghi ng  f unct i on  i s evaluat ed separately  on  gai ns  and 
l osses,  and  vari es bet w een 0  and  1  separately  f or  gai ns  and  l osses,  i nt egrati ng t o one i n t he dom ai n of  gai ns 
and i n t he dom ai n of  l osses separately.   I n experi me n t al  studi es i t   has been oft en f ound t hat   t he probabi l i t y 
we i ghi ng  i s s y mme t r i c bet w een gai ns  and  l osses;  nam el y,   t he  we i ghed  probabi l i t y  assigned  t o  a gai n  wi t h  a 
cert ain cum ul ati ve probabi l i t y over gai ns i s the sam e as that  assigned t o a l oss w it h t h e  s a me  c u mu l ati ve 
probabi l i t y  over  l osses ( Tver sky  and  K ahnem an,   1992).   Thi s propert y  i s call ed refl ecti on.
The  propert y  of  di mi ni shing  sensit i vi t y  i s conceptual l y  simi l ar  t o,   alt hough  used  i n  a di f f erent  cont ext  f r om ,  
t he  i dea of  “fi r st  order” r i sk aversion  as put   f orwa r d  by  Eps t ein  and  Zi n  ( 1990)  and  Segal   and  Spi vak  ( 1990).  
The  com m on  denom i nat or  of  t hese  t wo   concepts i s t he  f act  t hat   t he  ut i l i t y  f unct i on  exhi bi t s aversion  t o  sm all  
shocks.   I n expected ut i l i t y,   agents are practi call y r i sk-neut r al  over  sm all   shocks and onl y care about   l arge 
shocks (“second order” ri sk aversion).  Di mi ni shing sensi t i vi t y seem s to be a key advant age of prospect  
t heory as i t  avoi ds t he feature of the gl obal  concavit y of the ut i l i t y funct i on w hi ch, as show n by Rabi n 
( 2000b),   l eads t o an em pir i cal  absurdi t y of  expected ut i l i t y.   Ra bi n ( 2000b)  show s i n a cali brati on t heorem  
t hat   under  expected ut i l i t y,   assum ing any l evel  of  r i sk aversion t ow ards a l ot t ery wi t h stakes of  m oderate 
size,  agents have  t o  be  absurdl y  r i sk averse t ow ards  l ot t eri es i nvol vi ng  l arge  stakes.  At   t he  sam e t i me ,   t here 
m ay be si t uat i ons i n w hi ch dimi ni shing sensi t i vi t y becom es i mp l ausibl e. For  i nst ance, di mi ni shing
sensit i vi t y  ( r i sk  seeking)  i s unl i kel y  t o  hol d  i n  t he  dom ai n  of  l osses i f   t he  agent  r i sks povert y –  t he  ma r gi nal  
dol l ar  l ost   wh i ch t hrow s  hi m  i nt o  povert y  i s l i kel y  t o  carr y  a hi gh  di s-ut i l i t y  despi t e i t s bei ng  aw ay f r om   t he 
agent’ s r eference poi nt .
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I s prospect   t heory  r eall y  a seri ous  chall enger  t o  expected ut i l i t y,   and  does  i t   hel p  t o  expl ain  ma r ket   behavi our 
bet t er than expect ed uti l i t y t heory? A ccordi ng t o Cam erer (1998),  the evi dence i n i t s favour is such that  
cum ulati ve prospect   t heory shoul d be put   at  l east  on an equal   f oot i ng wi t h expected ut i l i t y.   On e   i m port ant 
asset  of  cum ulati ve  prospect   t heory  vi s-à-vi s ot her  behavi oural  t heori es i s cert ainl y i t s not   bei ng i nconsi stent 
wi t h  “rati onal ” behavi our  as defi ned i n  t he  r ati onal   expectati ons approach.  Thi s shoul d  ma k e   i t   easier  f or  t he 
29  As   not ed  by  Fennem a  and  van  A ssen (1999),   di mi ni shing  sensit i vi t y  “has  not hi ng  t o  do  wi t h  our  evaluat i on  of  m oney 
but   i t   i s purely  a ma t t er  of  percepti on  of  num bers”.  I n  t he  nei ghbourhood  of  poverty,  i t   i s l i kel y  t hat   our  percepti on  of 
m oney becom es m ore im port ant than our percepti on of num bers. In such a sit uat i on,  a concave uti l i t y funct i on over 
l osses i s presum ably  mo r e  appropri ate. 19
t heory t o be i ncorporated i n asset  pri cing m odel s based on no-arbi t r age condi t i ons t hat   are pervasi ve i n t he 
f i nance l i t erature. Mo r eover,  t he t heory i s int ui t i vel y appeal i ng,  as it  i s based on m uch st r onger
psychol ogi cal foundat i ons com pared w it h expect ed uti l i t y and yet  is m athem at i call y t r actable. Fi nal l y,  
prospect   t heory  can l ead t o  a pri cing  bi as i n  aggregate ma r ket   pri ces,  t o  t he  extent  t hat   assets are pri ced wi t h 
r espect  t o gai ns and l osses vi s-à-vi s an arbi t r ary r eference poi nt   wh i ch gai ns sali ence f or  econom i c agents, 
but   wh i ch mi ght   be  t ot all y  i r r elevant  i n  an expected ut i l i t y  f r am ew ork.
I t   i s som eti me s   me n t i oned t hat   a seri ous probl em  of  t he t heory i s t hat   i t   assum es aw ay how  t he r eference 
poi nt   i s det ermi ned.   Wh i l e t he  r eference dependence  f eature of  t he  t heory  cert ainl y  ma k e s   sense –  r eference 
poi nt s ma y   be det ermi ned by non-econom i c f actors such as social  norms  – ,   i t   shoul d ma k e   i t   mo r e di f f i cult  
f or  advocates of  prospect   t heory  t o  bui l d  general  asset  pri cing  m odel s wi t h  t he  sam e degree of  generali t y  as 
ma i nst r eam  f i nance t heori sts have done.   Thi s l i mi t ati on,   how ever,   shoul d not   be overem phasi sed.  As   not ed 
above,  mu c h  o f  ma i nst r eam  fi nance t heory i s bui l t  on t he m ean-vari ance ut i l i t y f unct i on,   wh i ch i mp l i cit l y 
assum es the exi stence of a reference point ,  nam el y t he curr ent level of w ealt h.  It  shoul d be feasibl e to 
devel op asset  pri cing m odel s based on prospect  t heory t aking t he sam e reference point  of ma i nst r eam
f i nance,   curr ent  w ealt h.   I n  addi t i on,   Ra bi n  ( 2000b)’ s cali brati on  t heorem  l ays bare t he  em pir i cal  absurdi t y  of 
expected uti l i t y,  wh i ch is li kel y t o encourage furt her wo r k on al t ernat i ve m odel s in t he fi nance l i t erature, 
especiall y i n cont exts wh e r e t he assum pti on of  r i sk neut r ali t y over  m oderate stakes i s not   appropri ate (as i t  
seem s t o  be  oft en t he  case i n  f i nance  probl em s).   Pr ospect   t heory  appears t o  be  a very  good  candi dat e t o  start  
wi t h.
5.  I s t he m arket  “rati onal ”? The debat e bet w een behavi our al  and
ma i nst ream   f i nance
Few,   i f   any,   ma i nst r eam  f i nance t heori sts cont end t hat   i ndi vi dual   agents cannot   behave i n an i r r ati onal   wa y  
and t hat   t he hom o econom i cus  i s anyt hi ng else t han a gross simp l i f i cati on t hat   does not   descri be accurately 
any  hum an  bei ng  ( i ncl udi ng  t he  t heori sts t hem sel ves).   At   t he  sam e t i me ,   econom i sts norma l l y  ma i nt ain  t hat  
t he f unct i oni ng of  ma r ket s ma y   be we l l   descri bed and predicted “as i f ”  agents we r e all  hom o econom i cus.
The analysi s of the funct i oni ng of ma r ket s is the core task of econom i cs, and econom i cs does not  –  and 
shoul d not   – deal  wi t h t he psychol ogy of  econom i c agents as an obj ecti ve per se ( Ma s - Col ell ,   1999),   but  
onl y (or at least ma i nl y) wi t h t he m arket  imp l i cati ons of it .  Ha r r y m ay err oneousl y bel i eve in t he “l aw  of 
sm all   num bers”,  but   does t hi s aff ect  hi s dem and f or  f i nanci al  assets? Sam   deri ves ut i l i t y f r om  me mo r y,   but  
does t hi s aff ect  hi s i nt er- t em poral  all ocati on of  consum pt i on and l eisure over  t he l i f eti me   t o any signi f i cant 
extent? Mo s t   i m port ant  of  all ,   do i ndi vi dual   behavi oural  bi ases cancel  out   i n t he aggregate,  eit her  because 
t hey  are of  opposi t e signs  or  due  t o  l earni ng  and  evol ut i onary  f orces?
I n essence,  t he debat e bet w een behavi oural  and ma i nst r eam  f i nance r evol ves around t he “as i f ” hypot hesi s. 
Mo s t  of t he debat e concerns,  i n part i cular,  wh e t her pri ces set on specul ati ve and hi ghl y com peti t i ve /  
devel oped fi nanci al ma r ket s are “rati onal ” or wh e t her a pri cing err or ari ses. Bot h behavi oural and20
ma i nst r eam  fi nance t heori sts agree that  studyi ng t hese m arket s shoul d be t he m ai n t ask of fi nance.  The 
f undam ent al  probl em ,  how ever,   i s t hat   no  agreem ent  i s r eached on  t he  very  defi ni t i on  of  “rati onal i t y”.
The  concept  of  r ati onal i t y norma l l y ma i nt ained by ma i nst r eam  f i nance t heori sts i s norma l l y i n t he beat - t he-
ma r ket  sense. Do  t he anom al i es determi ne expl oi t able profi t  opport uni t i es for a cunning arbi t r ageur? 
I ni t i all y,   t he  publ i cati on  of  t he  paper  by  De   Bondt   and  Thal er  ( 1985)  –  accordi ng  t o  w hom   t he  stock  ma r ket  
di splays a system ati c t endency  t o overreact   t o  new s  –  seem ed t o  deal  a bl ow   t o  t he  ma r ket   r ati onal i t y  even i n 
t he r estr i cted ( and f avoured by ma i nst r eam  t heori sts)  beat - t he-ma r ket   sense.  Ho we v e r ,   i n subsequent   years 
several  i nst ances of  ma r ket   under- r eacti on we r e also det ected.  Thi s has l ed Fam a  ( 1998)  t o claim  t hat   over-
and  under- r eacti on  anom al i es are simp l y  due  t o  chance,  and  t hat   ma r ket   eff i ciency prevail s on  average  ( t hus,  
no ex ant e expl oi t able excess profi t   opport uni t y  ari ses).   Mo r eover,   Fam a  ( 1998)  str essed t hat   mo s t   anom al i es 
are f r agil e and  do  not   wi t hst and  a closer  scrut i ny  and  /   or  a r easonabl e change i n  t he  stati sti cal  me t hodol ogy
( Ba r ber  and Lyon,   1997).   Today,   t here seem s t o be almo s t   a consensus t hat   t he ma r ket   i s mo s t   of  t he t i me s  
r ati onal   i n t hi s beat - t he-ma r ket   sense.  The  mo s t   soli d  proof  of  t hi s i s t hat   port f ol i o  m anagers,  and  i n  general 
acti ve i nvest me n t  str ategies,  do not  out perf orm  passive i nvest me n t  str ategies (especiall y w hen t r ansacti on 
costs are considered; see for exam ple M alki el,  1995).  In t hi s beat - t he-ma r ket  sense, ma i nst r eam  fi nance 
seem s t o  have  r esisted t he  “att ack” by  behavi ouri sts ( as behavi oural  f i nance advocates such as Thal er,   1999b,  
and  St atma n ,   1999,   conceded).   Ho mo   econom i cus i s sti l l   ali ve  here.
I t  is im port ant to st r ess, how ever,  that  ma r ket  rati onal i t y i n t he beat - t he-ma r ket  sense is not  necessari l y 
i nconsi stent  wi t h  t he  i dea t hat   anom ali es are a pervasi ve  and  system ati c behavi our  of  agents and  t hat   l ead t o 
a pri cing bi as. It  simp l y si gnal s that  it  is not easy to m ake m oney out  of these anom al i es, for exam ple 
because t here are l i mi t s t o  arbi t r age acti vi t y  ( see Shl eif er  and  Vi shny,   1997).   As   poi nt ed out   by  Mu l l ainat han 
and Thal er (2000) and Barberi s and Thal er (2001),  it  is im possibl e to arbi t r age aw ay m any inst ances of 
“ir r ati onal i t y”,   simp l y  because t here i s no  speculati ve  ma r ket   on  such ma t t ers or  because arbi t r age i s r i sky.
30
Thus,   a pri cing bi as t erm  mi ght   be i m possibl e t o arbi t r age aw ay,  and t he existence of  a pri cing bi as i s f ul l y 
com pati bl e wi t h  r ati onal   expectati ons  and  r andom   wa l k  behavi our  of  asset  pri ces.
Mo r eover,   t he argum ent   i ni t i all y att em pted by ma i nst r eam  f i nance t heori sts t o r econcil e t he overwh e l mi ng 
evidence  i n  f avour  of  t he  anom al i es wi t h  r ati onal i t y  of  t he  ma r ket   on  l earni ng  and  evol ut i onary  grounds  has 
proved t o be sl i ppery.
31 Ce r t ainl y t he l ong-l asti ng,  repeti t i ve envi r onm ent  of the fi nanci al ma r ket  shoul d 
pri ma   f aci e  provi de  agents wi t h  good  opport uni t i es f or  l earni ng  and  possibl y  corr ect  behavi oural  bi ases over 
t i me .  Ye t ,  learni ng i s m ade easier by a num ber of condi t i ons such as repeated opport uni t i es for practi ce, 
sm all  del i berati on cost s, avail abil i t y of good feedback, and  unchangi ng ci r cum stances. That  the fi nanci al 
ma r ket   provi des all   t hese condi t i ons i s doubt f ul .   For   exam ple,  i t   can hardl y be defi ned as an envi r onm ent  
30  Col i sk ( 1996)  expressed t hi s concept  f orceful l y as f ol l ow s:   “…  we   com m onl y  r ead i n  t he  f i nanci al  pages  t hat   f i r ms  
f ail   f or  l ack  of  profi t s,  but   we   seldom   r ead  i n  obi t uary  pages  t hat   peopl e  di e  of  subopt i mi sati on”  ( p.   684).   ( Ho we v e r ,   not  
qui t t i ng sm oki ng due t o i r r ati onal l y narr ow  fr am ing as di scussed in Secti on 3. 3 m ay  i ndeed lead to “dyi ng of 
subopt i mi sati on”!)   Ba r beri s and  Thal er  ( 2001)  state  t hat   “no  f r ee  l unch  can  also be  t r ue  i n  an  i neff i cient  ma r ket ”  ( p.   6).  21
wi t h  unchangi ng  cir cum stances ( Thal er,   2000).   A nd  wh i l e ma r ket   f orces ma y   provi de  pow erf ul   i ncenti ves  so 
as t o att enuat e behavi oural  bi ases,  t hey are unl i kel y t o do so com pletely ( see Sm i t h,   1991,   and Sm i t h and 
Wa l ker,  1993).  Thus,  the i dea of a convergence t o rati onal  expectati ons vi a learni ng on t he m arket  is a 
di f f i cult   r out e f or  ma i nst r eam  t heori sts ( see,   f or  i nst ance,  Ti mme r ma n ,   1994,   w ho  show ed  t hat   i t   w oul d  have 
been vi r t ual l y  i m possibl e f or  ma r ket   part i cipant s t o  “learn”  i n  r eal  t i me   t he  l aw  of  mo t i on  of  t he  U. K.   stock 
ma r ket ) .   Mo r eover,   l earni ng  i s closel y  r elated t o  experi me n t ati on.   I n  som e cont ext  of  i m port ance f or  f i nance,  
t he cost  of  experi me n t ati on ma y   be extr em ely hi gh ( Mu l l ainat han and Thal er,   2000);   f or  i nst ance,  decidi ng 
on  wh e t her  t o  t ake on  a house  mo r t gage  does  not   l eave mu c h   space f or  experi me n t ati on  ( and  l earni ng).
32  I n 
such sit uat i ons,  w e shoul d expect  the behavi oural bi ases to appl y i n ful l  force. Ov e r all ,  the evol ut i on /  
l earni ng argum ent   has proved di f f i cult   f or  ma i nst r eam  f i nance advocates.
33  I t   i s nevert hel ess of  t he greatest 
i m port ance to understand how behavi oural bi ases so w idespread at t he i ndi vi dual  l evel are all egedly 
convert ed int o rati onal i t y i n t he m arket pl ace, and – if  thi s is indeed the case – such convergence  t o 
rati onal i t y shoul d be ascri bed as a ma j or  achievem ent  of  t he ma r ket   m echanism  and not   negl ected as i t   i s 
curr entl y  t he case ( Ra bi n,   1998 and 2002b).
34  Ov e r all ,   i t   seem s t hat   a great  deal   of  r esearch i s needed i n  t hi s 
f i eld.
Mo s t   advocates of  behavi oural  f i nance,   i n any case,  cont end t hat   t he beat - t he-ma r ket   defi ni t i on of  ma r ket  
r ati onal i t y i s too narr ow  and not  relevant  fr om  a w el f are perspecti ve (Ba r beri s and Thal er,  2001).  The 
ul t i ma t e f unct i on  of  t he  f i nanci al  ma r ket   i s not   t o  all ow   agents t o  speculate over  f ut ure m ovem ent s i n  pri ces, 
but   r ather  ( over  t i me )   t o all ow  t hem  t o all ocate consum pt i on i n t he l i f eti me   i n an opt i ma l   m anner  and ( at  a 
cert ain poi nt   i n t i me )   t o all ocate f unds t o t he mo s t   product i ve i nvest me n t   opport uni t i es.  Ther e i s very l i t t l e 
r esearch on wh e t her  behavi oural  bi ases l ead t o mi s-all ocati ons of  capit al  and t o l ow er  econom i c grow t h i n 
t he  l ong  r un,  despi t e t he  obvi ous  i m port ance of  t hi s ma t t er.
35
At   t i me s ,   t he  evidence  seem s com pell i ng  t hat   ma r ket   pri ces are simp l y  absurd.   A  f am ous  case i s gi ven  by  t he 
shares pri ces of t he Royal  Du t ch-Shel l  group.  Al t hough t he i nt erests of the Royal  Du t ch and the Shel l
corporati ons  we r e me r ged  on  a 60-40  basi s,  t he  r ati o  bet w een t hei r   share pri ces devi ated by  mo r e t han  35%  
f r om  t he t heoreti cal  val ue of  60/ 40 dependi ng on t he l ocati on of  t r ade ( Fr oot   and D abora,  1999).
36  A not her 
possibl e key  exam ple i s t he  crash of  t he  Ne w  Yo r k  St ock  Exchange on  19  Oc t ober  1987,   wh i ch occurr ed i n 
t he absence of  any r elevant  new s wh i ch mi ght   have j ust i f i ed a coll apse of  mo r e of  20%  of  t he stock i ndex 
31  For   exam ple,  De   Long,   Shl eif er,   S u mme r s and  Wa l dm an  ( 1992)  show   t hat   agents w ho  f ail   t o  ma x i mi se t hei r   expected 
ut i l i t y  survi ve  ma r ket s bet t er  t han  expected  ut i l i t y  ma x i mi sers.
32  Br av and  H eaton  ( 2002)  r efer  t o  “rati onal   str uct ural  uncert aint y”  t o  show   t hat   f (x) ( t he  “fundam ent als”)  ma y   not   be 
l earnabl e at  all ,   even by  r ati onal   agents wi t h  unbounded  com putati onal   capabil i t i es.  I n  t hi s r espect,   t hey  poi nt   out   t hat  
t he  di sti nct i on  bet w een  behavi oural  and  r ati onal   t heori es  becom es  bl urr ed  i n  t he  presence  of  str uct ural  uncert aint y.  
33  For   exam ple,  Ny a r ko  ( 1991)  has  show n  t hat   l earni ng  m odel s can be  used  t o  exp lain  pri ce devel opm ent s wh i ch are ex
post   i nconsi stent  wi t h  r ati onal   expectati ons.
34  On   t hi s ma t t er,   see  also Evans   ( 1997)  and  St arme r   ( 2000).
35  Wu r gl er  ( 2000)  provi ded  i nt eresti ng  evidence  i n  f avour  of  ma r ket   r ati onal i t y  defi ned  as  t he  abil i t y  t o  all ocate  f unds  t o 
t he m ost  profi t able invest me n t  opport uni t i es, fi ndi ng i n a cross-count r y analysi s that  “fi nanci all y devel oped count r i es 
boost   i nvest me n t   mo r e  i n  t hei r   grow i ng  i ndust r i es  and  cut  i t   mo r e  i n  t hei r   decli ni ng  i ndust r i es”. 
36  Lam ont   and  Thal er  ( 2001)  report   simi l ar  episodes.22
val ue.   Gi ven  t hat   t he  stock  ma r ket   i ndex  ul t i ma t ely  r epresents t he  val ue  at  of  t he  U. S.   corporate sector,   how  
could t hi s value fall  so dram ati call y i n a m at t er of hours and w i t hout  any new  informa t i on?
37 Mo r e
f undam ent all y,   t he  “excess” vol ati l i t y  of  equi t y  pri ces as str essed by  Shi l l er  ( 1981)  and  t he  l arge  am ount   of 
t r ading i n fi nanci al ma r ket s wo r l d- wi de are dif f i cult  (albei t  nor im possibl e) to j ust i f y on purely “rati onal ” 
grounds.   A nd  f i nal l y,   w hy  agents t r ade so mu c h   ( O dean,  1998)? I t   seem s di f f i cult   t o  eschew  t he  expl anati on 
t hat  each tr ader thi nks t o be sm art er than t he average count erpart ,  alt hough t hi s is clearl y i m possibl e and 
“ir r ati onal ” ( Thal er,   1997).  
I t   w oul d be desi r able t hat   r esearch f ocuses i n t he f ut ure on a proper  defi ni t i on of  ma r ket   r ati onal i t y around 
wh i ch t o str uct ure t he debat e bet w een advocates of  behavi oural  and ma i nst r eam  f i nance.   A  very i nt eresti ng 
and prom i sing di sti nct i on i s betw een exogenous and endogenous rati onal i t y (Rubi nst ein,  2000).  By
exogenous  r ati onal i t y  we   ma y   defi ne  a sit uat i on  i n  wh i ch t he  ma r ket   pri ce opt i ma l l y  r efl ects som e exogenous 
obj ecti ve quant i t y ( e.g. ,   t he profi t abil i t y of  t he U. S.   corporate sector) ,   i . e.  t he pri cing bi as e shoul d be zero.  
The  case of  t he Royal   Du t ch-Shel l   group ( and possibl y also t he crash of  t he Ne w  Yo r k St ock Exchange i n 
1987) i ndi cates that  t he m arket  i s not  (alwa y s )  exogenous-r ati onal .  Thi s also underpi ns Shi l l er’ s (1981,  
1998)  claim  t hat   stock pri ces have m oved t oo mu c h   t o be expl ained by subsequent   changes i n di vi dends,  
alt hough  an expl anati on  based  on  ma r ket   eff i ciency ( i . e.,   t i me - varyi ng  stochast i c di scount   f actors)  cannot  be 
r ul ed out   eit her.   At   t he sam e t i me ,   t here ma y   be a f orm  of  endogenous r ati onal i t y accordi ng t o wh i ch each 
ma r ket   part i cipant   possesses an unbi ased esti ma t e of  t he ( f ut ure)  ma r ket   pri ce,  even i f   such ma r ket   pri ce i s 
com pletely det ached fr om  fundam ent als (f or exam ple, there is a bubbl e in equi t y pri ces and everybody 
acknow l edges t hi s,  but   each ma r ket   part i cipant   expects t he bubbl e t o cont i nue,   wh i ch f urt her  i ncreases t he 
probabi l i t y t hat   t he bubbl e cont i nues).
38  The  di sti nct i on bet w een endogenous and exogenous r ati onal i t y i s, 
how ever,   mo r e com pli cated i f   t he  f undam ent als t he  ma r ket   shoul d  depend  on  are t hem sel ves  aff ected by  t he 
ma r ket   evaluat i on – t ake,  f or  exam ple,  a self-f ul f i l l i ng att ack on an exchange r ate peg and t he consequent  
det eri orati on of  t he t erms   of  t r ade.  Ther e i s oft en a t endency ( probabl y because econom i sts are t hem sel ves 
aff ected by hi ndsi ght  bi as) to see a cert ain devel opm ent  caused by m arket  devel opm ent s as unavoi dabl e 
( support i ng  t he  i dea of  exogenous  r ati onal i t y),   but   i t   can som eti me s   be  t he  r esult   of  a self-f ul f i l l i ng  spir al  i n 
wh i ch t he  pri me   m over  i s i ndeed an “endogenous”  ma r ket   wh i ms i cal  m ove.  
Mu c h  r esearch has focused i n recent years on w hy l arge devi ati ons of ma r ket  val ues fr om  fundam ent als 
occur i n t he fi r st pl ace. St udyi ng herd behavi our (f or a survey see D evenow  and W el ch, 1995,  and 
Bi khchandani   and Shar ma ,   2000)  has been t he obj ect  of  consi derable eff ort   i n r ecent  years f or  i t s possibl e 
r ol e in am pl i f yi ng pri ce fl uct uat i ons and det ermi ne m arket  pri ces w hich dram ati call y devi ate fr om
f undam ent als.  Ho we v e r ,   t here i s no  clear  consensus i n  t he  profession  wh e t her  speculati ve  bubbl es are due  t o 
37 Of  course, com put er- based t rading and st op- l oss autom at i c rul es are oft en quot ed as the m ai n curpri t  of the 1987 
crash.  Ho we v e r ,   i t   i s doubt f ul   t hat   such r ul es  ma y   be  consi dered  as  bei ng  consi stent  wi t h  r ati onal i t y.
38  Thi s i s wh a t   Shl eif er  ( 2000)  r efers t o  as  “sm art ”  m oney  f ol l ow i ng  “dum b”  m oney.   Of   course,  t hi s i s not hi ng  else t han 
t he cl assic “beauty cont ext” of K eynes.  Thi s is, again,  an int eresti ng si mi l ari t y w i t h t he K eynesi an approach to 
econom i cs.23
i r r ati onal  excesses or t o t he “pathol ogi cal” aggregati on of r ati onal  behavi our at t he i ndi vi dual  l evel
( Zeckhauser,  Pat el and H endri cks, 1991).  “R ati onal ” herdi ng behavi our ( i . e.,  r ati onal  i n t he sense of
ma x i mi sing t he i ndi vi dual  ma r ket  part i cipant ’ s uti l i t y) ma y  c r eate “informa t i on cascades” w it h m arket  
part i cipant s possibl y t r ansm it t i ng f alse i nforma t i on,   t hus creati ng a negat i ve external i t y ( Ba ne j eree,  1992).  
Thi s m ay happen,  and can be expl ained i n an expected uti l i t y fr am ew ork,  w hen agents esti ma t e that  the 
i nforma t i on t hat  t hey receive (f r om  ot her t r aders) i s bett er t han t hei r  pri vat e informa t i on.  Thus,  not  
necessari l y i s herd behavi our  i nconsi stent  wi t h  r ati onal i t y –  not   surpri singl y,   herdi ng  i s actual l y  a t opi c mo r e 
r esearched in t he m ai nst r eam  fi eld t han i n t he behavi oural fi nance cam p. Sever al factors m ay reinforce a 
t endency t o herdi ng and conformi t y,   i ncl udi ng r eput ati on i n a pri nci pal - agent  cont ext  i f   t he perf orm ance of 
t he port f ol i o m anager (t he agent)  is costl y t o m oni t or (Schar f stein and St ein,  1990),  and t he fact that  
com pensati on  i s oft en com put ed com pari ng  wi t h  ot her  i nvest ors’  perf orm ance,  pushi ng  r i sk-averse t r aders t o 
conform t o t he “average” assessm ent of t he m arket .  In spi t e of not able theoreti cal devel opm ent s, t he 
em pir i cal  l i t erature has  t hus  f ar  f ail ed t o  provi de  convi nci ng  evidence  of  herd  behavi our  at  l east  i n  f i nanci al 
ma r ket s of devel oped count r i es, wh i ch is not  surpri sing as one shoul d i deall y separate pri ce m ovem ent s 
wh i ch refl ect fundam ent als fr om  pri ce m ovem ent s m erely refl ecti ng t he m ood of the m arket ,  and t hi s is 
obvi ousl y very di f f i cult  to do (see for exam ple Lakoni shock,  Schl eif er,  and V i shny,  1992,  and W erme r s,
1999).
39
Op t i ma l   ( r ati onal )   herdi ng mi ght   becom e a key t opi c i n r esearch as f ar  as t he overall   assessm ent  of  ma r ket  
r ati onal i t y i s concerned.   The  possibi l i t y t hat   herds – how ever  r ati onal l y f orme d  –  mi ght   dri ve pri ces aw ay 
f r om  f undam ent als mi ght   be i nt erpreted by som e as a str ong sign t hat   f i nanci al  ma r ket s are f undam ent all y 
i r r ati onal   and t hat   pri cing bi ases are t he r ul e.  The  i ssue i s part i cularl y i m port ant  and di f f i cult   t o sort   out   i n 
f i nanci al ma r ket s w hich essenti all y do not  have a “t ermi nal  condi t i on” (such as the st ock m arket  and t he 
f oreign  exchange ma r ket ) ,   nam el y  an exogenous  yardst i ck against   wh i ch t he  ma r ket   pri ce mu s t   be  evaluat ed 
at  som e predetermi ned poi nt   i n t i me   ( and wi t h wh i ch i t   i s possibl e t o ma k e   arbi t r age).   To  put   i t   simp l y,   an 
pri ce wi t h  a “blurr ed” and  non  arbi t r age-ablef   and  a “str ong”  f eedback g  i s bound  t o  becom e an att r actor  of 
“ir r ati onal ” t endenci es,  wh i l e assets wi t h  a clearl y  i dent i f i ed f undam ent al  ( a “clear” and  arbi t r age-ablef )   and 
a “w eak” f eedback g  are not   l i kel y  t o  be  a f ert i l e ground  f or  “ir r ati onal ” m ovem ent s,  how ever  defi ned.
S u mmi ng up,  is the cont r oversy about  ma r ket  rati onal i t y goi ng t o be sort ed out  any t i m e soon? Thi s is 
unl i kel y because, as Fam a (1998) poi nt ed out ,  ma r ket  eff i ciency is per se un-t estable. In fact,  testi ng t he 
hypot hesi s t hat   t he  ma r ket   i s eff i cient  r equi r es a m odel   of  expected r eturns,   wh i ch i s actual l y  t ested t oget her
wi t h  t he  hypot hesi s.  On l y  t he  evidence  t hat   i t   i s possibl e t o system ati call y  beat  t he  ma r ket   w oul d  be  a bul l et -
proof wa y  t o di scredit  the hypot hesi s of ma r ket  eff i ciency. Thus far,  behavi oural fi nance has fail ed to 
provi de  such evidence.  
39  He r d i ng  behavi our  has  been  post ul ated also f or  i nvest me n t   analyst s ( Gr aham ,  1999),   again  on  r eput ati onal   grounds.  
Ri sk-averse i nvest me n t   analyst s wi l l   t end  t o  clust er  on  t he  average and  be  very  conformi st,   f or  t he  l oss of  bei ng  wr ong 
ma y   be  hi gher  i f   t he  ot her  i nvest me n t   analyst s  we r e  r i ght .  24
A  f i nal   r em ark  i s due  on  wh e t her  t he  all eged i nfl uence  of  behavi oural  bi ases on  f i nanci al  ma r ket s call s f or  a 
pol i cy r esponse.   Da n i el  et  al  ( 2002)  are t he onl y ones t o deal  wi t h t hi s i ssue di r ectl y.   A ccordi ng t o t hese 
authors,  governm ent s are l i kel y t o be aff ected by behavi oural  bi ases as we l l ,   wi t h t he di f f erence t hat   t hey 
w oul d not   be subj ect  t o t he pow erf ul   di scipl i nary f orce of  com peti t i on.  Thus,   t hei r   i nvol vem ent   i n sett i ng 
ma r ket  pri ces w ould probabl y be count erproduct i ve (Wu r gl er,  2000,  r eport s em pir i cal evidence t hat
governm ent  i nt ervent i on reduces the econom i c eff i ciency of f i nanci al ma r ket s).  At  t he sam e t i me ,
governm ent s coul d ma k e   i nves t ors mo r e aw are of  t hei r   psychol ogi cal  bi ases and  of  t he  i ncenti ves  t hat   ot hers 
have t o expl oi t   t hem ,   creati ng som e r oom  f or  pol i cy i nt ervent i on i n t erms   of  r eport i ng r ul es and di sclosure. 
Mo r eover,   pol i cy-ma k e r s shoul d  be  at  l east  aw are t hat   ma r ket s ma y   at  t i me s   di splay i r r ati onal   t endenci es and 
t hat   pri cing  bi ases ma y   exist.   Ap a r t   f r om   t he  di f f i cult y  i n  i mp l em enti ng  pol i cy m easures aime d   at  corr ecti ng 
t hese  bi ases,  t hi s aw areness mi ght   at  l east  i ncrease pol i cy-ma k e r s’  understandi ng  of  t he  wo r l d,   wh i ch mi ght
be benefi cial  i n i t self .  
6.   Concl udi ng  rem arks
Behavi oural  f i nance  i s a r apidl y  grow i ng  area of  r esearch and  one  of  t he  mo s t   prom i sing  f i elds  of  econom i cs. 
The  f ert i l i sati on  of  f i nance  ( and  econom i cs i n  general)   wi t h  psychol ogi cal  i deas and  evidence  ma k e s   i t   a very 
i nt eresti ng  and  l i vel y  f i eld.   At   t he  sam e t i me ,   i t   coul d  be  argued  t hat   behavi oural  f i nance  i s r unni ng  t he  r i sk 
of bei ng un-parsim oni ous (W achter,  2002;  Ti r ol e, 2002).  Wh i l e the l i st of anom al i es discovered is now  
i mp r essive,   convi nci ng  evidence  i s sti l l   t o  be  provi ded  t hat   expected ut i l i t y  i s a f l aw ed analyt i cal  f r am ew ork 
t o st udy t he behavi our of agents in a (f i nanci al)  ma r ket  cont ext,  wh i ch is at the core of the econom i cs 
di scipl i ne.
40  A  bul l et - proof  evidence  t hat   t he  ma r ket   i s not   r ati onal   i n  t he  ma i nst r eam  f i nance  sense i s yet   t o 
be  provi ded,   alt hough  m any  hi nt s t hat   t he  ma r ket   ma y   not   be  r ati onal   i n  ot her  r easonabl e senses have  i ndeed 
been provi ded.  
Ag a i nst   t hi s background,   t he key chall enge f or  behavi oural  f i nance seem s t o be t o study i n mo r e det ail   t he 
ma r ket   i mp l i cati ons  of  t he  wi del y  docum ent ed agents’  behavi oural  bi ases.  I n  part i cular,   t o  study  how   pri ces 
are det ermi ned  i n  l arge  com peti t i ve  ma r ket s mo r e r ecourse t o social ,   r ather  t han i ndi vidual   psychol ogy mi ght  
be  wa r r anted.  As   not ed,  behavi oural  bi ases can aff ect  aggregate ma r ket   out com es onl y  t o  t he  extent  t hat   t hey 
do not   cancel  out   on aggregate.  Thus,   “social” seem  a bet t er  candi dat e t han “indi vi dual ” behavi oural  bi ases 
t o understand m arket  behavi our.  The wor k on synchroni sati on of  expectati ons,  fads and the rol e of 
com m uni cati on  ( see,  e.g. ,   Shi l l er,   2000a,   2000b)  seem s t o  be  mo s t   prom i sing  i n  t hi s r espect.
I n addi t i on,  a m ore thorough anal ysi s of t he possi bl e defi ni t i ons of ma r ket  rati onal i t y fr om  a wel f are
perspecti ve w oul d be greatl y benefi cial.  Do e s  i t  support  social we l f are that  it  is im possibl e to beat  the 
ma r ket ? Do e s   i t   ham per  we l f are t hat   a l arge stock ma r ket   can f all   by 20%  i n a ma t t er  of  hours wi t hout   any 
40 Mo r eover,  the l arge num ber of approaches fol l ow ed l eaves it  open t o t he cri t i cism  of “reverse engi neeri ng” (Zi n,  
2002).  By ma ki ng m argi nal  ut i l i t y st ate-dependent ,  behavi oural theori es could expl ain every phenom enon.  A  good 
t heory m ust  inst ead be able to expl ain t h e  mo me n t s that  it  w as  not desi gned t o m at ch (W achter,  2002).  Ho we v e r ,  
prospect   t heory  i s cert ainl y  a  very  parsim oni ous  t heory.25
new s?  The  answ ers t o  t hese  quest i ons  are l i kel y  t o  shed som e l i ght   on  t he  r elati ve  me r i t s of  behavi oural  and 
ma i nst r eam  f i nance.   The  t wo   approaches need not   t o be seen necessari l y as antagoni st;   i t   ma y   we l l   be t hat  
bot h are useful  to expl ain t hei r  part  of reali t y,  dependi ng on t he probl em  under invest i gat i on and t he 
defi ni t i on  of  r ati onal i t y  t hat   i t   i s appropri ate f or  t he  i ssue at  hand.
A not her  key i ssue on wh i ch mo r e r esearch i s needed i s wh e t her,   even assum ing t hat   behavi oural  bi ases do 
di stort   asset  pri ces i n l arge and com peti t i ve ma r ket s,  t here are signi f i cant  i mp l i cati ons f or  t he qual i t y of  t he 
all ocati on of  capit al  and ul t i ma t ely f or  l ong-t erm  econom i c grow t h.   Thus f ar,   t here has been no system ati c 
att em pt  t o address t he i ssue of  t he f eedback,  and onl y som e i nforma l   speculati ons have been provi ded ( see 
Shi l l er,   2000a,   and  Da n i el  et  al,   2002).  
Fi nal l y,   one f urt her  i nt r i gui ng area of  r esearch i s r epresented by t he study of  possibl e behavi oural  bi ases of 
l arge  actors such as pol i cy-ma k e r s ( f or  exam ple centr al  bankers;  see al - No wa i hi   and  St r acca,  2002).   B ecause 
of  t hei r   size and  r ol e,  t hese  actors have  a di r ect  i nfl uence  on  f i nanci al  ma r ket s and  t hei r   all eged behavi oural 
bi ases ma y   cert ainl y have r epercussions on ma r ket   out com es.  I n addi t i on,   l earni ng and evol ut i onary f orces 
are deem ed to appl y l ess forceful l y t han for atom i sti c agents part i cipat i ng i n a l arge,  com peti t i ve m arket .  
Ho we v e r ,  an analysi s of t he system ati c psychol ogi cal t r ait s of econom i c pol i cy-ma k e r s is yet t o be 
devel oped,   and  r epresents a chall enge  f or  f ut ure r esearch. 26
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